

# The Saving Glut of the Rich \*

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## Abstract

There has been a large rise in savings by Americans in the top 1% of the income or wealth distribution over the past 35 years, which we call *the saving glut of the rich*. The saving glut of the rich has been as large as the global saving glut, and it has not been associated with an increase in investment. Instead, this rise in savings has been associated with substantial dissaving by the non-rich and dissaving by the government. A process by which the financial sector is unveiled reveals that rich households have accumulated substantial financial assets that are direct claims on household and government debt. Analysis using variation across states shows that the rise in top income shares has been important in generating the saving glut of the rich.

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# 1 Introduction

There has been a substantial rise in savings by Americans in the top 1% of the income or wealth distribution since the early 1980s. This saving glut of the rich has not been associated with a rise in investment; instead, it has been associated with substantial dissaving by households in the bottom 90% and dissaving by the government. A novel methodology that unveils the financial sector directly links the rise in borrowing by households and the government to savings by rich Americans. Analysis using variation across states points to the rise in top income shares since the early 1980s as an important force generating the rise in savings by the rich.

Savings across the distribution of U.S. households is estimated using two separate techniques. The first relies on the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) together with an estimation of income and consumption across the income distribution. The second relies on household wealth reported in the Financial Accounts of the Federal Reserve and the evolution of wealth across the wealth distribution over time. The results imply an increase in the savings by the top 1% of the distribution of 3 to 4 percentage points of national income annually when comparing the 1960s and 1970s with 2000 to 2016.

To put this magnitude into perspective, the average annual savings by the top 1% of the distribution have been larger than average annual net domestic investment since 2000. The magnitude can also be compared to the increase in the average U.S. current account deficit since the 1980s, which represents savings entering the United States from other countries and is therefore connected to the global saving glut (e.g., [Bernanke \(2005\)](#)). The rise in savings by the top 1% of the distribution has been on the same order of magnitude as savings entering the United States from abroad.

National accounting dictates that the rise in savings by the top 1% must have been absorbed by some other part of the economy. In a closed economy, a natural place to look would be net domestic investment. However, investment has declined since the 1980s. In an open economy, it is also possible for some of the savings to have found its way overseas. But, as is well known, the current account position of the United States has moved in the opposite direction. The United States as a whole has borrowed more from the rest of the world during this time period.

This leaves only one remaining margin: the government and the rest of the U.S. household sector must have reduced saving substantially. This is what the analysis finds. Savings by the bottom 90% of the income or wealth distribution have fallen significantly since the early 1980s. Furthermore, the government has run larger deficits, especially after the Great Recession.

The rise in savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution since the early 1980s has been driven by a rise in the accumulation of financial assets. The rich have not been accumulating more real estate, nor have they been borrowing less. The dissaving of the bottom 90% has been driven by both a rise in borrowing and a decline in the accumulation of financial assets. A large body of

research has emphasized how middle-class Americans are borrowing more over time. But this is only part of the story: the decline in the accumulation of financial assets has been a quantitatively more important driver of the dissaving by the bottom 90%, especially since the Great Recession.

A direct link between saving by the rich and borrowing by the non-rich and by the government can be seen through a methodology in which the financial sector is “unveiled” in order to track who ultimately holds the claims on government and household debt. This unveiling methodology proceeds in two steps. First, government debt and household debt are allocated to three potential providers of capital: the rest of the world, the government, and the U.S. household sector. This allocation is done using the extensive information on the linkages within the financial sector that are detailed in the Financial Accounts. The second step then allocates these holdings across the wealth distribution based on ownership shares of each asset class.

The final product from the methodology allows us to quantify exactly how much of the savings by those at the top of the wealth distribution have been invested in financial assets that are claims on government and household debt. To the best of our knowledge, this unveiling process is novel to the literature, and potentially can be done for other asset classes and in other countries.

Since the early 1980s, almost half of the rise in financial asset accumulation of the top 1% of the wealth distribution has been a rise in the accumulation of claims on household and government debt. Furthermore, while the rest of the world has been an important financier for household and government debt, Americans in the top 1% of the wealth distribution have been equally important. From the 1980s until 2016, household debt and government debt increased annually by an average of 3 percentage points of national income more compared to the 1960s and 1970s. Half of this increase was financed by the rest of the world, and half was financed by the top 1%.

The unveiling exercise also allows for a calculation of net household debt positions across the wealth distribution, which we define as household debt held as a financial asset minus household debt owed as a liability. Net household debt positions clarify that rich Americans have increasingly financed the borrowing of non-rich Americans. From 1982 to 2007, the net household debt position of the bottom 90% fell by almost 40 percentage points of national income, while the net household debt position of the top 1% rose by 15 percentage points. That is, 37.5% of the rise in net household debt owed by the bottom 90% was financed by the top 1%.

Demonstrating that rich Americans directly finance the borrowing of the non-rich and the government is important given a growing body of research showing that financial assets are not perfectly substitutable across investors (e.g., [Greenwood et al. \(2018\)](#), [Kojien and Yogo \(2019\)](#)). If financial investment is not perfectly fungible across assets, then the fact that the rich have accumulated substantial positions in household and government debt may have affected prices and quantities of outstanding debt over time.

It may be surprising that Americans in the top 1% of the wealth distribution hold so much

household and government debt in their portfolios, but the unveiling process clarifies how this is in fact the case. For example, holdings of business equity by rich Americans represent a substantial claim on household debt. The reason is that non-financial businesses have increased their holdings of money market funds and time deposits substantially since the mid 1990s, and these time deposits and money market funds are claims on household debt through the financial system. More generally, household debt and government debt have been financed by rich Americans through direct bond holdings, mutual fund holdings, business equity, and defined contribution pensions. The unveiling methodology is necessary to see these patterns.

The rise in savings by Americans at the top of the income distribution is directly connected to the rise in income inequality. This result is established using a state-year level panel data set that allows us to exploit variation across states in the rise in top income shares. Such a specification removes common aggregate patterns that occurred since the 1980s, and therefore brings us closer to the ideal thought experiment of examining economies with different shifts in top income shares while holding all else equal. The state-level specification allows us to control for other factors that may be related to the rise in savings by the rich, such as demographics, changes in the industrial shares of employment, and financial deregulation.

From the early 1980s to 2008 (the last year in which state-level data is available), states with the largest rise in top income shares experienced the largest rise in savings by top income earners. The magnitude is substantial: in the cross-section of states, a one standard deviation higher rise in the top income share leads to a 0.8 standard deviation rise in savings by the rich.

The core findings of this study are robust across a number of data sets. They are also robust to the various issues regarding the estimation of income and wealth shares that have been raised in the literature. The baseline analysis uses income shares from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and income and wealth shares from the Distributional National Accounts (DINA) microfiles made available publicly by [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#). The baseline analysis using the DINA microfiles makes adjustments to the assumed interest rate earned by those in the top 1% of the wealth distribution (e.g., [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#)). The baseline analysis using the DINA microfiles also makes an adjustment to the imputation of pension wealth given issues raised by [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#).<sup>1</sup> The adjusted DINA microfiles used here produce a rise in top income and wealth shares that is, if anything, smaller than the rise in other data sets.

**Implications** The twin phenomena of rising debt and declining interest rates has occurred across many advanced economies since the early 1980s (e.g., [Summers \(2014\)](#), [Jordà et al. \(2016\)](#)). Existing work has focused on the “global” or cross-country saving glut to explain these patterns. How-

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<sup>1</sup>Results using wealth shares from the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA) are also presented in the appendix; however, the DFA are only available from 1989 onward which is a major limitation for the analysis. The rise in the top 1% wealth share from 1989 to 2016 is smaller in the adjusted DINA microfiles used here relative to the rise in the DFA.

ever, the analysis here suggests that there is also an “internal” and potentially equally important saving glut of the rich.<sup>2</sup>

The findings also imply that aggregate measures of saving provide an incomplete portrait of how savings evolve in an economy. While national savings have fallen in the United States since the 1980s, savings by rich Americans have increased substantially. The decline in the aggregate personal savings rate is not evidence against the idea that there has been a saving glut of the rich.<sup>3</sup>

The findings also call into question the idea in many macroeconomic models that a rise in savings automatically translates into additional capital formation. In the United States over the past 35 years, the substantial rise in savings by the top 1% has been associated with dissaving by the government and the bottom 90%, as investment actually fell.

This is related to the reasons behind the growth in the size of the financial sector since the 1980s (e.g., [Philippon \(2015\)](#)). Traditional models view the primary role of the financial sector as channeling savings by the household sector into investment by the business sector. This has not occurred over the past 35 years. Instead, the growth in the financial sector since the 1980s appears to be driven to a large degree by the channeling of savings from some households into borrowing by the government and borrowing by other households.

**Related literature.** Several studies in the wealth inequality literature conduct an exercise to estimate saving rates across the distribution (e.g., [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#), [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#)). However, none of these studies use this exercise to answer the key question of this study: how has the total amount of savings by different parts of the income or wealth distribution evolved over time? This study is the first to place savings from different parts of the distribution into a national accounting framework, and to explore where these savings ultimately settle. This study is also the first to directly link the financial asset accumulation of the rich to borrowing by the non-rich and to borrowing by the government.

There is also a growing literature focused on the rise in household debt in the United States. Most of this literature is focused on trends immediately before the Great Recession.<sup>4</sup> One exception is the recent working paper of [Bartscher et al. \(2020\)](#), which examines the rise in household debt since 1949 across the income distribution. Many of the results in [Bartscher et al. \(2020\)](#) are complementary to the analysis here. For example, from 1983 to 2016, [Bartscher et al. \(2020\)](#) find no material change in the debt to income ratio of households in the top 1% of the income distribu-

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<sup>2</sup>This finding is related to the idea that rising inequality puts downward pressure on interest rates given high saving rates of the rich (e.g., [Stiglitz \(2016\)](#), [Rachel and Smith \(2017\)](#), and [Rachel and Summers \(2019\)](#)). The saving glut of the rich and the global saving glut may be closely linked; [Klein and Pettis \(2020\)](#) argue that rising savings by current account surplus countries is driven by increased savings by the rich in those countries.

<sup>3</sup>A similar point is made by [Pettis \(2017\)](#).

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, [Mian and Sufi \(2015\)](#), [Bhutta and Keys \(2016\)](#), [Mian and Sufi \(2017\)](#), [Adelino et al. \(2018\)](#), [Foote et al. \(2016\)](#); and [Albanesi et al. \(2017\)](#)

tion, but a dramatic rise in the debt to income ratio of households in the bottom 90% of the income distribution. However, [Bartscher et al. \(2020\)](#) do not attempt to link the savings by the rich to the borrowing of the non-rich, which is a main focus of this study.

The findings presented here are also related to the literature exploring consumption, income, and wealth inequality (e.g., [Slesnick \(2001\)](#), [Krueger and Perri \(2006\)](#), [Blundell et al. \(2008\)](#), [Heathcote et al. \(2010\)](#), [Aguiar and Bils \(2015\)](#), [Attanasio and Pistaferri \(2016\)](#), [Meyer and Sullivan \(2017\)](#), [Guvenen et al. \(2017\)](#), [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#), [Wolff \(2017\)](#), [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#), [Guvenen et al. \(2019\)](#), [De Nardi et al. \(2018\)](#), and [Batty et al. \(2019\)](#)). As shown below, this literature is an important input into the measurement of the consumption share of the top 1% over time.

[Cynamon and Fazzari \(2015\)](#) show evidence that the bottom 95% needed to borrow more after 1980 in order to keep consumption levels steady in the face of rising income inequality. A similar argument is made in [Rajan \(2011\)](#) and [Bertrand and Morse \(2016\)](#). In these studies, the emphasis is on an increase in credit demand by low income households because of lower income levels. Instead, this study emphasizes how an increase in credit supply coming from the top 1% may have contributed to higher debt levels of the bottom 90%, which helps explain why interest rates fell during this period. To motivate their model, [Kumhof et al. \(2015\)](#) show a number of stylized aggregate facts that are consistent with the idea that rising income inequality led to rising household debt in the years prior to the Great Recession. However, there is no attempt to directly link the rise in saving of the rich to the dissaving of the non-rich, as is done here. The state-level analysis linking top income shares to the rise in savings is novel to the literature.

## 2 Data and Measurement

### 2.1 Aggregates

The goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the contribution to aggregate savings from different parts of the distribution of U.S. households. The starting point of the measurement exercise is national income.<sup>5</sup> Let  $Y$  be GDP,  $Z$  be National Income,  $C$  be personal consumption expenditures,  $G$  be government consumption,  $I$  be total gross domestic investment (which includes both government and private domestic investment), and  $(X - M)$  be net exports. The standard GDP equation is:

$$Y = C + G + I + (X - M) \tag{1}$$

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<sup>5</sup>National income is preferred to GDP for measuring saving behavior because national income excludes the non-economic income item capital depreciation (or “consumption of fixed capital” as it is called in the national accounts). Furthermore, national income includes payments to U.S. owners of capital which is located abroad, and it excludes payments to foreign owners of capital which is located in the United States.

Let  $\delta$  be consumption of fixed capital, and  $W$  be net income from abroad.<sup>6</sup> The definition of national income is  $Z = Y - \delta + W - \epsilon$ . Then equation 1 can be written as:

$$Z - C = G + I^n + F - \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where  $F = (X - M + W)$  is the current account of the United States,  $I^n = I - \delta$  is net domestic investment and  $\epsilon$  is the statistical discrepancy that equalizes Gross Domestic Income with Gross Domestic Product in the National Accounts. The term  $G$  is related to taxes  $T$ , transfers  $R$ , and government borrowing  $B^g$  through the government budget constraint  $B^g = G + R - T$ , which then allows us to write equation 2 as:

$$\Theta = Z - T + R - C = I^n + F + B^g - \epsilon \quad (3)$$

This is the definition of aggregate private savings ( $\Theta$ ): national income minus taxes plus transfers minus personal consumption expenditures. Notice that Account 6 of the NIPA gives us the equation:  $S^p + S^\pi - B^g = I^n + F - \epsilon$ . This gives us another definition of private savings:

$$\Theta = Z - T + R - C = S^p + S^\pi = I^n + F + B^g - \epsilon \quad (4)$$

This makes it clear that the definition of private savings ( $\Theta$ ) includes both personal savings ( $S^p$ ) and business savings ( $S^\pi$ ).

As equation 4 shows, the notion of savings in national accounts is that the NIPA does not recognize differences in savings across the distribution of households. If one household saves more by lending to another household, then there is no change in  $\Theta$ . In the aggregate, private savings only increase if there is an increase in investment ( $I^n$ ), the current account ( $F$ ), or borrowing by the government ( $B^g$ ).

This study measures  $\Theta_{it}$ , which is the savings by group  $i$  of households in year  $t$ . By construction,  $\sum_{i \in I} \Theta_{it} = \Theta_t$ . There are two techniques used to measure  $\Theta_{it}$ . The first approach uses the following definition:

$$\Theta_{it} = Z_{it} - T_{ti} + R_{it} - C_{it} \quad (5)$$

More specifically,  $\Theta_{it}$  is pre-tax income minus taxes plus transfers minus consumption. This is referred to as the *income less consumption approach*.

The second approach relies on estimates of wealth and the consumer budget constraint that links savings to wealth accumulation, what we call the *wealth-based approach*. The basic idea is to infer

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<sup>6</sup>More specifically,  $W$  comes from the Foreign Transactions Current Account (Account 5) and is defined as income and transfer receipts from the rest of the world minus income payments and transfers to the rest of the world.



savings from the evolution of net worth and an estimate of asset price inflation. This is similar to approaches taken in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#), [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#). This approach starts with the budget constraint:

$$Z_{it} - T_{it} + R_{it} - C_{it} = \sum_{j \in J} (P_t^j A_{it}^j - P_{t-1}^j A_{i,t-1}^j) \quad (6)$$

where  $\Theta_{it} = Z_{it} - T_{it} + R_{it} - C_{it}$  is savings by group  $i$  and  $A_{it}^j$  is asset  $j$  held by the group  $i$ . There are a total of  $J$  asset types that households hold, with liabilities showing as negative values. Let  $\pi_t^j \equiv \frac{P_t^j - P_{t-1}^j}{P_{t-1}^j}$  be asset price inflation for asset  $j$ . Then equation (6) simplifies to:

$$\Theta_{it} = \sum_{j \in J} (\Delta W_{it}^j - \pi_t^j W_{i,t-1}^j) \quad (7)$$

This approach relies on measures of wealth held by group  $i$  in asset class  $j$  in year  $t$  ( $W_{it}^j$ ), and measures of pure asset price inflation  $\pi_t^j$ .

An approach not used here would be to use an estimate of after-tax saving rates from survey data such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the Survey Consumer Finances. The main drawback of such an approach is that the relevant income measure for calculating the contribution to national savings from any group must include all income, not just income reported in surveys. The claim on business savings (or undistributed corporate profits,  $S^\pi$  in equation 4 above) is one important example. Such savings have been rising over time (e.g., [Chen et al. \(2017\)](#)) and have represented 4.5% of National Income since the Great Recession. These savings would be missed in an approach using survey measures of saving rates.

Furthermore, [Heathcote et al. \(2010\)](#) show an average gap of 21 percentage points between the NIPA measure of personal income and the measure in the Current Population Survey. They show that most of the difference comes from the fact that NIPA includes employer contributions to pension and health care plans and the dividends and interest payments realized on pensions that are not distributed to households. The bottom line is that any approach using survey data to estimate the contribution to national savings from any group will be systematically underestimated given these important sources of savings that are missed in surveys.

Recent research suggests that expected Social Security benefits should also be counted as wealth (e.g., [Catherine et al. \(2020\)](#)). The national accounting framework used here takes fully into account taxes that are paid into Social Security (part of  $T$ ), benefits received by beneficiaries (part of  $R$ ), and any saving that the government does within the Social Security system (part of  $B^g$ ). Beyond these flows (which are already taken into account in the analysis below), it would be incorrect in a national accounting framework to claim that individuals “save” through Social Security. In the



national accounting framework used here, savings must be real resources that ultimately flow to some other sector in the economy. If the government promises its citizens payments in the future but does not invest in an asset that backs such a claim, then it is not savings in a national accounting framework.<sup>7</sup> The discipline of the national accounts is important because the government could make infinite promises of future benefit payments, but such promises would have zero effect on national savings unless the government put real resources behind such promises.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.2 Overview of data sets used

After-tax income shares are obtained from the Congressional Budget Office (e.g., [CBO \(2019\)](#)). Consumption shares are estimated using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), following the methodology in [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) which is described in detail below in Section 2.3.

Data from the Distributional National Accounts (DINA) microfiles are also used in the analysis below ([Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#)). These microfiles rely on the yearly public-use tax return files available at the National Bureau of Economic Research, along with calculations to allocate national income that is not included as part of tax returns, as outlined by [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#). The DINA microfiles are used to calculate shares of national income across the income distribution, and they are used to calculate wealth shares across the wealth distribution using the capitalization technique outlined in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#).<sup>9</sup>

There are two important adjustments that are made relative to the methodologies outlined in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) and [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#). The first relates to the distribution of pension income and pension wealth not captured on tax returns, an issue raised in [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#). The internal returns on undistributed pensions that are part of national income but are not reported on tax filings must be distributed across the income and wealth distribution. The baseline methodology in [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#) uses realized taxable and non-taxable pension income as reported on tax returns to distribute this income.

However, [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#) argue that the non-taxable pension income reported on tax

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<sup>7</sup>Comparing the 1983 to 2016 period with the 1963 to 1982 period, Social Security increased its annual average savings by 0.9 percentage points of national income, which is already captured in the  $B^g$  above. As shown below, the bottom 90% decreased their annual average savings by between 4.4 and 6.3 percentage points of national income depending on the methodology used. Even under the most extreme assumption that all of the savings by Social Security is assigned to the bottom 90%, it would still be small compared to the decline in the savings of the bottom 90% over the same time period. We prefer not to assign Social Security's savings to the household sector, following the logic of the national accounts that  $B^g$  is separate from  $\Theta$ . For example, while the Social Security system increased its savings, the government as a whole reduced its savings by 2.3 percentage points of national income annually; assigning even half of this decline in savings to the bottom 90% would more than offset the rise in savings by Social Security.

<sup>8</sup>A similar argument applies to unfunded defined benefit pensions, which we also exclude when estimating the savings by households.

<sup>9</sup>In Appendix Section D, results on the level of savings from 1989 onward are shown using the wealth shares from the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA) produced by the Federal Reserve. As mentioned in the introduction, the DFA data are unavailable prior to 1989, which is a major limitation in using them for our analysis.

filings are actually rollovers from Individual Retirement Accounts, and are therefore not income but a rollover of wealth. As a result, the pension income of higher income Americans is over-estimated if one uses the non-taxable part of the pension income reported on tax filings. We follow [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#) and use only the taxable pension income reported on tax filings to estimate the undistributed pension income component of national income and pension wealth. This change affects both the distribution of national income and wealth, given that pension wealth is obtained by capitalizing the income earned on pensions. As shown in [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#), this adjustment brings the estimate of pension wealth across the income distribution in the DINA closer to the distribution in the SCF.<sup>10</sup>

The second adjustment relates to the capitalization of fixed income on tax returns to measure fixed income wealth across the wealth distribution (e.g., [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#)). Translating flows of income into stocks of wealth requires an assumption of the rate of return on assets, a process detailed in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#). Research suggests that the baseline methodology in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) overstates the level of fixed income asset holdings of the top 1% given the assumption of a constant rate of return on fixed income assets when estimating fixed income wealth from fixed income asset cash flows (e.g., [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#)).<sup>11</sup> This manifests itself in the assumed capitalization factor one uses to multiply the fixed income asset cash flows to obtain fixed income wealth.

Given this issue, the capitalization technique used in this study assumes that the top 1% of the wealth distribution earns a return on fixed income assets that is 100 basis points larger than the rest of the population. The 100 basis point assumption is motivated by evidence from the SCF in [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#) that shows that the top 1% of the wealth distribution realizes on average 95 basis points more in fixed income return than the rest of the population from 2004 to 2016, a result we replicate in Appendix Figure A1.<sup>12</sup>

Appendix Figure A2 shows the change in the wealth share of the top 1% of the wealth distribution using the original DINA, the adjusted DINA, and the DFA. As it shows, the top 1% wealth

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<sup>10</sup>[Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#) make a number of other adjustments to the DINA methodology to obtain the striking result that the after-tax share of national income of the top 1% has not risen over the past 40 years. We have investigated each of these adjustments, and we have concluded that the pension adjustment is the only adjustment that is justified in our setting. The substantial rise in the after-tax share of income of the top 1% is also present in the Congressional Budget Office series.

<sup>11</sup>This point is acknowledged in Section IV.F of the original [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) article.

<sup>12</sup>There is an active debate in the literature whether the interest rate on fixed income assets for the top 1% should be assumed to be even higher than 100 basis points (e.g., [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#), [Saez and Zucman \(2020\)](#)). This is related to the interest rate earned by those in the top 0.1% of the wealth distribution, which [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#) argue should be assumed to be the Moody's Aaa corporate rate. Such an assumption would imply a 340 basis point higher interest rate for the top 0.1% relative to the bottom 99% from 2004 to 2016. The analysis here uses the average 100 basis point difference shown in [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#) given that this is the estimated difference in the SCF for the top 1% of the wealth distribution relative to the bottom 99% (replicated in Appendix Figure A1). This is our preferred estimate because there are no issues measuring either wealth or the interest rate earned on fixed income assets in the SCF.

share using the adjusted DINA, which is the benchmark used in this study, shows a smaller rise compared to the rise using the DFA from 1989 to 2016. Appendix Figure A2 also plots the change in the income share of the top 1% of the income distribution using the original DINA, the adjusted DINA, and the CBO. Relative to the CBO, the adjusted DINA series shows a smaller rise in the top 1% income share until 2007. The total rise in the income share of the top 1% is almost identical comparing the early 1980s to the end of the sample. If anything, the adjusted DINA microfiles used in this study imply a smaller rise in wealth and income of the rich during the sample period relative to other data sets.

### 2.3 The income less consumption approach

Starting from equation 5, we use both the CBO and the DINA microfiles (adjusted for the pension issue as noted above) to measure the first three terms that define  $\Theta_{it}$ :  $Z_{it}$ ,  $T_{it}$ , and  $R_{it}$ . When constructing these variables using the DINA, we use the adult individual as the unit of observation and we split income equally among spouses.<sup>13</sup> For the CBO income series, we take the CBO after-tax income shares reported and multiply the share by  $Z_t - T_t + R_t$ . As a result, the after-tax income amounts across the distribution for both the DINA and CBO add up to the same aggregate figure.<sup>14</sup>

The last component needed to measure savings by each income group ( $\Theta_{it}$ ) is consumption ( $C_{it}$ ). Measurement of the consumption of the top of the income distribution is the most challenging aspect of the measurement exercise given the lack of a comprehensive data set focused on consumption of the rich. The approach taken here is to rely on two items: the share of consumption across the income distribution in a given baseline year, and an assumption of the evolution of the consumption to income ratio of the top 1% over time. We purposefully rely on conservative assumptions to generate the consumption share of the top 1% over time, given that the data are weakest on this particular item.

There are three main groups that are the focus of the analysis below: the top 1% of the income distribution, the next 9%, and the bottom 90%. Unfortunately, survey data sets typically used in the consumption literature such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) do not measure the consumption of the highest income households in the economy well.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>As noted in [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#), trends in marriage rates mean that the rise in top income shares is over-stated when using tax units as the unit of observation.

<sup>14</sup>Notice that the aggregate variable we are trying to match is  $Z_t - T_t + R_t$ , not national income. In [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#), the post-tax shares of national income are designed to add up to  $Z_t - T_t + R_t + G_t - B_t^g$ , which given the government budget constraint adds up to  $Z_t$ .

<sup>15</sup>There is a large literature discussing the potential under-reporting of consumption by the rich in various surveys, but the Consumer Expenditure Survey in particular. See for example, [Aguar and Bils \(2015\)](#), [Carroll et al. \(2015\)](#), [Attanasio and Pistaferri \(2016\)](#), and [Meyer and Sullivan \(2017\)](#). The issue is two-fold: first, the very rich are typically not surveyed. Second, even conditional on being surveyed, the rich may under-report actual consumption more than

Instead, we follow the analysis in [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#), which uses the Survey of Consumer Finances to obtain consumption shares across the income distribution. The SCF has the advantage of having extensive coverage of high income and high wealth U.S. households. Since 2004, the SCF has also asked questions on expenditures on certain consumption categories. In particular, as [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) show, expenditures on food eaten at home, food eaten away from home, housing, new vehicle purchases, and used vehicle purchases can be measured using the SCF surveys from 2004 to 2016.

[Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) use the CEX to show that the expenditure share of the goods reported in the SCF relative to total expenditures is stable across the income distribution, a result we have replicated. Although the CEX does not contain the richest U.S. households, the expenditure share on the categories reported in the SCF is stable even up to the richest households in the CEX. As a result, [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) use the consumption shares across the income distribution on goods reported in the SCF as the consumption share for all goods across the income distribution.<sup>16</sup>

The average consumption share of the top 1% of the income distribution using the [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) measure is 6.6% from 2004 to 2016. This is substantially higher than the consumption share using other data sets such as the PSID. For example, using PSID data from 2005 to 2013 (which contain the most comprehensive measures of household spending), we obtain a consumption share of the top 1% of the income distribution of 3.8%.<sup>17</sup> This is consistent with the fact that the PSID does not survey the highest income U.S. households, and that consumption is likely more under-reported by the highest income households in the PSID.

The baseline consumption share of the top 1% is 6.6%, which we use for 2010 which is the mid-point of the years available from the SCF. How has this consumption share evolved over time? This is the most challenging variable to measure, as there is no data set that covers the consumption of rich U.S. households over the long time period of our sample, which is 1963 to 2016.

To generate the consumption share of the top 1% over time, the methodology follows evidence in [Aguiar and Bils \(2015\)](#) and assumes that the consumption to income ratio of the top 1% has been constant over time, which would imply that consumption shares and income shares have increased at the same growth rate. This follows from the evidence in [Aguiar and Bils \(2015\)](#) that consumption inequality and income inequality have risen at a similar rate over time. It is important to recognize that this is a long-run assumption, as we are interested in measuring how consumption shares have

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the non-rich.

<sup>16</sup>[Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) also use the SCF survey waves of 1989 to 2001 following a similar procedure. However, prior to 2004, the SCF survey waves did not contain a question on food purchased for consumption at home and food purchased for consumption away from home. Given the importance of spending on these goods, we use only the 2004 to 2016 waves in which spending on food at home and away from home can be measured.


<sup>17</sup>This consumption share from the PSID does not include an adjustment for implicit rent paid by homeowners. [Fisher et al. \(2016a\)](#) make such an adjustment and find generally higher consumption shares for those at the top of the income distribution in the PSID.

evolved over a 50 year period.

The assumption of a constant consumption to income ratio over time is conservative, because it is likely that the consumption to income ratio falls in income even over long time periods (e.g., [Straub \(2019\)](#)). The average post-tax real income of the top 1% implied by their share of national income was \$418 thousand in 1982 and \$1.008 million in 2016 (in 2016 dollars). In contrast, the average post-tax real income of the bottom 90% increased from \$29 thousand to \$46 thousand. Given estimates in the literature, it is unlikely that the consumption to income ratio for the top 1% stayed constant given a rise in real income of 150%. If the consumption to income ratio of the top 1% has fallen over time, then the saving glut of the rich would be estimated to be even larger.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 1 plots the consumption share of the top 1% of the income distribution using this methodology. As it shows, the consumption share of the top 1% using this methodology has risen substantially over time, from 4 to 5% in the 1960s and 1970s, to 6 to 7% from 2010 to 2016.

Figure 1: Consumption Share of the Top 1% of the Income Distribution



The average consumption share of the top 1% from 2004 to 2016 comes from [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#). This average consumption share is used as the baseline in the year 2010. Then the time series is generated using the assumption of a constant consumption to income ratio.

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<sup>18</sup>We could also use the time series from the SCF from 2004 to 2016. The consumption share of the top 1% in the SCF is almost completely flat from 2004 to 2016, despite a rising in the share of income going to the top 1%. The assumption of a flat consumption share would significantly increase the size of the saving glut of the rich. However, we are hesitant to use this time series given the Great Recession occurred in the middle of this period. It is important to note that the assumed consumption to income ratios over time are meant to capture long-run trends as opposed to short-run changes due to cyclical factors. [Heathcote and Perri \(2018\)](#) show that such cyclical factors are important in explaining consumption to income ratios across the wealth distribution during recessions.

## 2.4 The wealth-based approach

Following equation 7, the wealth-based approach requires measurement of wealth held by group  $i$  in asset class  $j$  ( $W_{it}^j$ ) and inflation for asset class  $j$  ( $\pi_t^j$ ). For  $W_{it}^j$ , we first measure aggregate wealth in asset class  $j$  ( $W_t^j$ ), and then we use an estimate of the share of aggregate wealth in asset class  $j$  held by group  $i$  in year  $t$ , which we call  $\omega_{it}^j$ . Then,  $W_{it}^j = \omega_{it}^j * W_t^j$ .

The terms  $W_t^j$  come from the Table B.101 from the Financial Accounts by the Federal Reserve, which represents the aggregate balance sheet of the household and non-profit sector. The first two columns of Table A1 in the appendix show the name of each asset class  $j$  and its associated code in the Financial Accounts. An alternative would be to use Table B.101.h which is exclusively the balance sheet of the household sector. However, there are two limitations associated with Table B.101.h. First, it does not start until 1987, and our analysis requires data back to 1963. Second, holdings of certain securities such as Agency GSE bonds by households versus non-profits cannot be separated, even in recent years. The ability to measure such holdings is crucial for the unveiling procedure described in Section 4. For Table B.101, we exclude any wealth category that is exclusively associated with non-profits.<sup>19</sup>

Both the DINA microfiles and DFA are used to measure  $\omega_{it}^j$ . This requires a mapping from the asset class categories in B.101 of the Financial Accounts to the DINA and the DFA. The full details of this mapping are in columns 5 and 6 of Appendix Table A1. The DFA data do not begin until 1989; as a result, the DINA micro files are used as the baseline to estimate  $\omega_{it}^j$ . However, Section D shows results on the level of savings for 1989 onward using the data from the DFA to estimate  $\omega_{it}^j$ .

Finally, the wealth-based approach to measuring saving requires a  $\pi_t^j$  for each asset  $j$ . In theory,  $\pi_t^j$  refers to asset price inflation that is driven only by inflation or valuation effects. To use the consumer price analogy,  $\pi_t^j$  is the change in nominal value of the asset holding constant the “quality” and identity of the asset. For example, the asset should not change in terms of expected cash flows.

For housing assets,  $\pi_t^j$  is estimated using a repeat-sales house price index that controls for any changes in housing size or quality. The results shown in this paper use the Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database for the house price index because of its longer coverage. However, the JST index is highly correlated with other repeat-sales indices, such as CoreLogic. In a robustness check, we also allowed  $\pi_t^j$  to vary by income cohort  $i$  by using income-sorted zipcode-level house price index, but this did not change results materially.

For fixed income assets,  $\pi_t^j$  is equal to zero given the manner in which the Financial Accounts are reported. However, in the case of debt, write downs must be taken into account, especially given the importance of debt write-downs during the Great Recession. Debt write-downs imply that  $\pi_t^j$

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<sup>19</sup>Conceptually, savings by non-profits are part of national savings and so should therefore be included. By using B.101, the methodology here implicitly assumes that the shares of non-profit assets held by households across the wealth distribution are the same as the shares of assets held directly by households.



needs to incorporate a valuation gain for the borrower. In the absence of such an adjustment, the methodology would incorrectly conclude that borrowers saved part of their income to pay down debt. The likelihood of debt write-downs varies considerably by income group  $i$ , with lower income borrowers more likely to default and therefore experience a write-down. Therefore,  $\pi_t^j$  is calculated for mortgage and non-mortgage debt separately for the top 10% and bottom 90%, with the valuation terms being indexed as  $\pi_t^{ij}$ .

The terms  $\pi_t^{ij} = 1 - WD_t^{ij}$  where  $WD_t^{ij}$  is the percentage of debt that is written down in a particular year for group  $i$ .  $WD_t^{ij}$  is estimated by first calculating net chargeoffs as a share of outstanding debt on bank balance sheets, separately for mortgage and non-mortgage consumer credit. Since we know total outstanding debt in a given year, the net chargeoff ratio gives us the total amount of debt that is written down. We then distribute the written down debt to group  $i$  based on the fraction of total defaults accounted for by group  $i$ . This number is computed using zip code level data on defaults and average income of households living in a zip code.<sup>20</sup>

Finally,  $\pi_t^j$  must be estimated separately for corporate equities, assets which have within them other corporate equities (such as pensions), and non-corporate business equities. When estimating  $\pi_t^{equity}$ , the previous literature has used capital gains on equity. We depart from this assumption because  $\pi_t^{equity}$  is not the same as capital gains. The price of a share reflects savings done by the corporation on behalf of the shareholders. The appreciation in the price of the share that reflects such retained earnings should not be reflected in  $\pi_t^{equity}$ , as this is actual saving. Using capital gains as the measure of  $\pi_t^{equity}$  will mistake the rise in corporate savings as pure asset price inflation.

Furthermore, a share may generate a yield, which shows up as  $Z_{it}$  in equation 6, through either dividends or share buybacks. In the case of the latter, this is because buybacks change the quality of the asset – a share after a buyback cannot be considered equivalent to a share before the buyback. For these reasons, the typical share price gain is not the same as  $\pi_t^{equity}$ . An additional complication that arises in calculating  $\pi_t^{equity}$  is that the observed equity wealth, such as the one reported in the Financial Accounts of the Federal Reserve, is itself imputed using various valuation metrics. As such, what we really need is the “inflation” in these valuation metrics over time.

Given all these considerations, estimating  $\pi_t^{equity}$  is a challenge. However, given that we have estimated  $\pi_t^j$  for all other asset types,  $\pi_t^{equity}$  can be calculated as the residual pricing factor that ensures that aggregate private savings calculated using the wealth-based approach matches the aggregate private savings in NIPA ( $S^p + S^\pi$  in equation 4 above). The resulting  $\pi_t^{equity}$  has a correlation with the equity capital gains series from the JST Macrohistory Database of 0.90. However, the mean of  $\pi_t^{equity}$  is 2.4 percentage points lower. The lower mean is exactly what should be expected given that capital gains includes corporate savings, which have been high during the sample period and should not be included in  $\pi_t^{equity}$ .

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<sup>20</sup>The complete details of this methodology are shown in Appendix Section A.3.



The wealth-based approach to calculation of savings across the distribution is also implemented in [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#), [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#). However, as far as we can tell, the methodologies in these studies are not designed to match total private savings from the NIPA. There are two additional features of the methodology here that are different. First, by using total private savings from the NIPA to pin down  $\pi_t^{equity}$  instead of capital gains, the methodology appropriately captures corporate savings that accrue to households. This has a material effect on savings given the large increase in corporate savings in the United States over time (e.g., [Chen et al. \(2017\)](#)). Second, debt write-downs are modeled here as a valuation gain instead of as active saving. This more accurately captures the nature of debt write-downs, which are not “saving” in the sense of earned income being used to pay back debt.

The DINA micro-files are a repeated cross-section, not a panel of individuals. This does not present any issues for the income less consumption approach to calculation of savings of Section 2.3. For the income less consumption approach, savings in a given year are calculated as the savings by individuals that are in the top 1% in the same year. These need not be the same individuals over time.<sup>21</sup>

However, the repeated cross-section nature of the DINA files introduces an issue for the wealth-based approach, given that the wealth-based approach relies on changes in asset values from the past year to this year. For example, consider the group of individuals that are in the top 1% of the income distribution. For the top 1% in a given year  $t$ , the change in the assets held from year  $t - 1$  to  $t$  for this specific group is not possible to recover given the repeated cross-section nature of the data. As a result of this problem, the wealth-based methodology follows the literature ([Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#), [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Smith et al. \(2020\)](#)) by sorting individuals by wealth instead of income. The logic of this decision is to try to reduce the amount of migration by individuals across groups; an individual’s place in the wealth distribution is more stable than the individual’s place in the income distribution over time.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>There is no panel data set that covers the very top of the income or wealth distribution, and so using a repeated cross-section is the only option for the analysis here. This may be a concern if there has been a rise in transitory income shocks so that there is more across-group switching over time. However, [Kopczuk et al. \(2010\)](#) use the Social Security Administration data to show that “all of the increase in the variance of annual (log) earnings since 1970 is due to an increase in the variance of permanent earnings (as opposed to transitory earnings).” See also [Güvenen et al. \(2017\)](#).


<sup>22</sup>In their Appendix C, [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#) use the PSID to explore how often households transition across wealth percentile groups, and they find that “the share of households that remain within their respective wealth group ... is generally high.”

### 3 Magnitude and Absorption of Top 1% Savings

#### 3.1 Magnitude

Figure 2 shows average annual savings by the top 1% using the income less consumption approach with the DINA microfiles, the income less consumption approach with the CBO after-tax income shares, and the wealth-based approach. For the income less consumption approaches, savings by the top 1% of the income distribution are shown; for the wealth-based approach, savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution are shown. Annual savings are scaled by aggregate national income, and the five-year averages are shown. The 1978 to 1982 period average savings is subtracted for each series.

Figure 2: Savings by the Top 1%



This figure plots savings by the top 1% over time. The DINA and CBO measures represent savings by the top 1% of the income distribution measured using the income less consumption approach, where income shares come from the Distributional National Accounts and the Congressional Budget Office, respectively. The wealth-based approach measures savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution. For all three series, annual savings are scaled by annual national income, and five year averages are plotted. The 1978 to 1982 period is subtracted for all series.

All three measures indicate a substantial increase in savings by the rich from the 1980s onward. The wealth-based approach is more volatile, which is due to the volatility of the asset price inflation terms ( $\pi_t^j$ ) in equation 7. However, the average increase is similar across all three measures. The income less consumption approach using CBO income shares and the wealth-based approach both show that savings by the rich peaked in the 2003 to 2007 period, whereas the income less consumption approach using the DINA micro files suggests that savings by the rich continued to rise from

2008 to 2016.

Table 1 presents average savings by the rich over time. The breaks in time chosen in Table 1 capture the main macroeconomic episodes of the time period. The rise in top income shares and household debt began in the early 1980s; we choose 1983 as the initial breakpoint to avoid issues related to the recessions of 1980 and 1981-1982. The breakpoint in 1998 is meant to capture the period in which house price growth and household debt accelerated substantially. The breakpoint in 2008 captures the momentous Great Recession and its aftermath. For transparency, the full time series is always shown in addition to means by these four periods.<sup>23</sup>

Table 1: Savings by the Top 1%

Period	Levels			Relative to 63-82		
	DINA	CBO	Wealth-based	DINA	CBO	Wealth-based
63-82	0.053	0.036	0.028	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.064	0.049	0.042	0.011	0.013	0.014
98-07	0.075	0.064	0.071	0.021	0.028	0.043
08-16	0.085	0.063	0.064	0.032	0.027	0.036

This table shows savings by the top 1% over time. The DINA and CBO measures represent savings by the top 1% of the income distribution measured using the income less consumption approach, where income comes from the Distributional National Accounts and the Congressional Budget Office, respectively. The wealth-based measure uses the wealth-based approach to measure savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution. Annual savings are scaled by annual national income, and averages are shown for each period. For the CBO columns, the initial period includes only data from 1979 to 1982, as 1979 is the first year the data are available.

The level of savings by the top 1% differ across the three methodologies, but the rise in savings relative to the 1963-1982 period is similar. All three techniques imply a rise in annual savings scaled by aggregate national income of about 3 to 4 percentage points when comparing the 1960s and 1970s to the post 2000 period.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.2 Absorbtion through traditional channels

National accounting provides for a simple decomposition exercise to understand where savings by the top 1% have ultimately settled. Starting with equation 4, we split savings across the income

<sup>23</sup>The breakpoints are similar to those used in [Bartscher et al. \(2020\)](#), who call the years between 1965 to 1983 the “stability” period, the 1983 to 2007 period the “second debt boom”, and the years between 2007 to 2016 the period of “crisis and deleveraging.”


<sup>24</sup>A discussion of the implied saving rate of the top 1% under the income less consumption approach and the wealth-based approach is located in Appendix Section A.5. As we show there, the implied saving rate of the top 1% is consistent with the existing literature once missing forms of income with a high saving rate are taken into account.

distribution and move all terms except for savings by the rich to the right hand side to obtain:

$$\Theta_{top1,t} = I_t^n + F_t + B_t^g - \Theta_{next9,t} - \Theta_{bot90,t} \quad (8)$$

The saving glut of the rich could have been associated with a rise in net domestic investment  $I^n$  or it could have been associated with more investment in other countries ( $F$ ). If neither of these happened, then a rise in savings by the rich must have been associated with dissaving by other households or by the government.

Figure 3: Net Domestic Investment, Current Account Surplus, and Government Borrowing



This figure plots net domestic investment, the current account surplus, and government borrowing. For all three series, annual flows are scaled by annual national income, and five year averages are plotted. The 1978 to 1982 period is subtracted for all series.

Figure 3 plots net domestic investment, the current account surplus, and government borrowing over time. As the figure shows, net domestic investment and the current account position have moved in the opposite direction as would have been required to absorb savings by the top 1%. Government borrowing has been more volatile. The government boosted borrowing from 1983 to the early 1990s, followed by a period in which the government began to run surpluses in the late 1990s. However, after the Great Recession, government borrowing has increased substantially, representing almost 5 percentage points of national income more than the baseline period 1978 to 1982.

Table 2: Traditional Channels of Absorption

Period	Levels			Relative to 63-82		
	$I^n$	$F$	$B^g$	$I^n$	$F$	$B^g$
63-82	0.114	0.003	0.030	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.088	-0.020	0.051	-0.026	-0.023	0.022
98-07	0.091	-0.050	0.026	-0.022	-0.053	-0.004
08-16	0.046	-0.033	0.086	-0.068	-0.036	0.056

This table shows net domestic investment  $I^n$ , the current account surplus  $F$ , and government borrowing  $B^g$ . For all three series, annual flows are scaled by annual national income, and averages are plotted for the period in question.


Table 2 shows both the level and changes relative to the 1963-1982 period for these same three variables. Net domestic investment has fallen dramatically since 2008; from 2008 to 2016, net domestic investment has been 7 percentage points of national income lower than the pre-period.

A comparison of the evolution of the current account position in the fifth column of Table 2 with the evolution of top 1% savings in Table 1 allows for a direct comparison of the global saving glut (e.g., Bernanke (2005)) and the saving glut of the rich. Since 1982, the saving glut of the rich has been between 50 and 75% the size of the global saving glut when using the income less consumption approach. When using the wealth-based approach, the global saving glut and the saving glut of the rich have been almost the same size.


### 3.3 Dissaving by the bottom 90%

The main variable that has moved contemporaneously with the rise in savings by the top 1% has been a decline in savings by the bottom 90%. This pattern is shown in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c. Annual savings by households in the 90th to 99th percentile of the income distribution (what we call the next 9%) have been steady over time.


Figure 4: Saving across the Distribution



(a) Income less consumption, DINA



(b) Income less consumption, CBO



(c) Wealth-based approach

This figure plots savings across the distribution over time. The DINA and CBO measures represent the savings across the income distribution measured using the income less consumption approach, where income shares come from the Distributional National Accounts and the Congressional Budget Office, respectively. The wealth-based approach measures savings across the wealth distribution. For all series, annual savings are scaled by annual national income, and five year averages are plotted. The 1978 to 1982 period is subtracted for all series.

In contrast, there has been a large decline in the savings by the bottom 90% of the income distribution. Table 3 reports the average annual savings by the bottom 90%. As before, the DINA and CBO columns are based on the income less consumption approach, whereas the last column is based on the wealth-based approach. Across all three methodologies, the bottom 90% has saved substantially less post 2000 relative to the 1963 to 1982 period.

Table 3: Dissaving by the Bottom 90%

Period	Levels			Relative to 63-82		
	DINA	CBO	Wealth-based	DINA	CBO	Wealth-based
63-82	0.041	0.073	0.044	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	-0.004	0.033	0.022	-0.045	-0.040	-0.022
98-07	-0.045	-0.012	-0.029	-0.085	-0.085	-0.073
08-16	-0.028	0.017	-0.004	-0.069	-0.056	-0.048

This table shows savings by the bottom 90% over time. The DINA and CBO measures represent the savings by the top 1% of the income distribution measured using the income less consumption approach, where income comes from the Distributional National Accounts and the Congressional Budget Office, respectively. The wealth-based measure uses the wealth-based approach to measure savings by the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. Annual savings are scaled by annual national income, and averages are shown for each period. For the CBO columns, the initial period includes only data from 1979 to 1982, as 1979 is the first year the data are available.

This decline in savings by the bottom 90% has been significantly larger than the increase in savings by the top 1%. This reflects the fact that both the global saving glut and the saving glut of the rich have increased substantially after 1982, and net domestic investment has actually fallen. Both the influx of foreign capital and the rise in savings by the top 1% have been associated with a large decline in savings by the bottom 90%.

Figure 5 accumulates all of these margins of absorption of savings by the top 1%. Starting with equation 8, we re-arrange to obtain:

$$\Theta_{top1,t} + \Theta_{bot99,t} - B_t^g - I_t^n - F_t + \epsilon_t = 0$$


For each of the 6 variables, we construct  $\hat{V}_t = V_t - V_{pre}$ , where  $V_{pre}$  is defined to be the average of variable  $V$  in the 10 years prior to 1983. Then for each variable we sum across all  $t$  to obtain  $\bar{V} = \sum_{t=1983}^{2016} \hat{V}_t$  where  $\bar{V}$  is the accumulation of the differences relative to the pre-period average. Therefore,

$$\Theta_{top1}^- + \Theta_{bot99}^- - \bar{B}^g - \bar{I}^n - \bar{F} + \bar{\epsilon} = 0 \quad (9)$$

Equation 9 implies that the accumulated savings by the top 1% ( $\Theta_{top1}^-$ ) must be absorbed by one of the other five terms.



Figure 5: Absorption of Accumulated Savings by the Top 1%



This figure presents the accumulated differences relative to the averages of the 1973 to 1982 levels in the equation:  $\Theta_{top1} + \Theta_{bot99} - \bar{B}^g - \bar{I}^n - \bar{F} + \bar{\epsilon} = 0$ . These terms represent savings by the top 1%, the bottom 99%, in addition to borrowing by the government, net domestic investment, capital outflows, and the statistical discrepancy. All annual flow measures are scaled by contemporaneous aggregate national income before integration. The  $\Theta_i$  terms come from the wealth-based approach to calculation of savings.

Figure 5 shows the accumulation of each of the six variables in equation 9. The figure uses the wealth-based approach to calculate savings. By construction, the bars sum to zero. The accumulated savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution have been more than national income from 1983 to 2016. Capital flows and investment have moved in the opposite direction as would have been needed to absorb some of the saving glut of the rich. To maintain the accounting identity, the combined savings by both the government and the bottom 99% must have fallen substantially. Figure 5 shows that most of the decline in saving was by the bottom 99%. The accumulated dissaving of the bottom 99% from 1983 to 2016, relative to the average level from 1973 to 1982, was more than twice national income.

### 3.4 Breaking down savings: asset accumulation and borrowing

The wealth-based approach to the measurement of savings allows for a more detailed look into the drivers of changes in savings across the wealth distribution. For example, the dramatic decline in savings by the bottom 90% was masked by strong valuation gains in housing. To see this, start with equation 7 and let  $\Delta NW_{bot90,t} = \sum_{j \in J} \Delta W_{bot90,t}^j$  be the annual change in net worth of the bottom 90%,  $\Delta V_{bot90,t} = \sum_{j \in J} \pi_t^j W_{bot90,t-1}^j$  be the valuation effect, and  $\Theta_{bot90,t}$  be savings. By equation 7,  $\Theta_{bot90,t} = \Delta NW_{bot90,t} - \Delta V_{bot90,t}$ . These three terms are calculated for each year, and scaled by

national income in that year.

Table 4 shows the averages by periods for these three terms. From 1983 to 2007, the annual changes in net worth of the bottom 90% relative to the pre-period were negative but relatively small. From 1963 to 1982, the bottom 90% on average experienced an annual rise in net worth of 9.6 percentage points of aggregate national income, which fell to 9 percentage points from 1983 to 1997, and to 7.1 percentage points from 1998 to 2007.

Table 4: Dissaving by the Bottom 90%: Valuation Effects

Period	Levels			Relative to 63-82		
	$\Theta$	$\Delta NW$	$\Delta V$	$\Theta$	$\Delta NW$	$\Delta V$
63-82	0.044	0.096	0.052	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.022	0.090	0.068	-0.022	-0.006	0.016
98-07	-0.029	0.071	0.099	-0.073	-0.025	0.048
08-16	-0.004	0.021	0.025	-0.048	-0.074	-0.026

This table decomposes average annual savings by the bottom 90% ( $\Theta_{bot90,t}$ ) into changes in net worth and valuation gains:  $\Theta_{bot90,t} = \Delta NW_{bot90,t} - \Delta V_{bot90,t}$ . Annual changes are scaled by national income, and then the average is taken for the period in question.

However, strong valuation gains in the housing market in particular masked a more dramatic decline in savings. The annual flow of savings by the bottom 90% fell by 7.3 percentage points of national income from 1998 to 2007 compared to the 1963 to 1982 period. When the housing market collapsed, so did the effect of valuation gains on net worth, which resulted in a much lower annual change in net worth during the 2008 to 2016 period relative to the pre-period. This exercise shows the dangers of focusing exclusively on changes in net worth when assessing saving patterns in the economy. Valuation gains in certain asset classes may boost net worth even when actual savings have declined.

These findings are consistent with those in [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#) who use a completely different data set (the SCF+) and find a similar result. [Kuhn et al. \(2019\)](#) write that “price effects account for a major part of the wealth gains of the middle class and the lower middle class,” and that these price effects are driven by house price gains. They show that fixing house prices would lead to a substantial decline in the wealth share of households in the 50th to 90th percentile of the wealth distribution from 1989 to 2007, which is related to the finding here that high valuation gains masked a decline in savings for the bottom 90% during this period.

The wealth-based approach also allows us to explore the precise manner in which the top 1% boosted savings, and the precise manner in which the bottom 90% reduced savings. To do so,

we start again with equation 7. We split asset classes  $j$  into three groups: financial assets (FA), real estate (RE), and debt (D). This allows us to decompose savings by each group  $i$  into:  $\Theta_{it} = \Theta_{it}^{FA} + \Theta_{it}^{RE} + D_{it}$ , where negative values of  $D$  indicate more borrowing.

Table 5 decomposes savings according to this equation for the top 1% of the wealth distribution and the bottom 90%.<sup>25</sup> For the top 1%, the rise in savings is driven entirely by a rise in savings into financial assets ( $\Theta^{FA}$ ). In fact, the accumulation in financial assets is even larger than the rise in savings because the top 1% also borrowed slightly more. In recent years, the rich are accumulating more financial assets; they are not paying down debt or accumulating real estate.<sup>26</sup>

Table 5: Decomposing Savings

Top 1%								
Period	Levels				Relative to 63-82			
	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$
63-82	0.028	0.027	0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.042	0.042	0.003	-0.003	0.014	0.015	0.001	-0.002
98-07	0.071	0.073	0.003	-0.004	0.043	0.046	0.001	-0.003
08-16	0.064	0.062	0.001	0.001	0.036	0.035	-0.001	0.002
Bottom 90%								
Period	Levels				Relative to 63-82			
	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$
63-82	0.044	0.060	0.025	-0.040	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.022	0.050	0.018	-0.045	-0.022	-0.010	-0.007	-0.005
98-07	-0.029	0.027	0.017	-0.073	-0.073	-0.033	-0.007	-0.033
08-16	-0.004	0.013	-0.001	-0.016	-0.048	-0.046	-0.026	0.024

This table decomposes the average annual savings by the top 1% and the bottom 90% through the equation  $\Theta_{it} = \Theta_{it}^{FA} + \Theta_{it}^{RE} + D_{it}$ .  $\Theta_{it}^{FA}$  is asset accumulation in financial assets,  $\Theta_{it}^{RE}$  is asset accumulation in real estate, and  $D_{it}$  is the change in debt (where a negative  $D$  represents more borrowing). Annual savings are scaled by national income, and then the averages for the period are calculated.

For the bottom 90%, the dissaving relative to the pre-period has been driven by both more borrowing ( $D$ ) and less financial asset accumulation ( $\Theta^{FA}$ ). This is especially true for the 1998 to

<sup>25</sup>The next 9% table is shown in Appendix Table A3.

<sup>26</sup>It is important to note that B.101 of the Financial Accounts places all tenant-occupied housing owned by the household sector into the business sector, which is owned by households through their holdings of business equity. As a result, any accumulation of tenant-occupied housing shows up as financial asset accumulation, not accumulation of real estate.

2007 period. In fact, comparing 1998 to 2007 to the 1963 to 1982 pre-period, the decline in savings by the bottom 90% coming from borrowing was the same size as the decline coming from reduced financial asset accumulation (3.3 percentage points of national income annually).

The rise in household debt during the 1998 to 2007 period has been the focus of a large body of research, and indeed it was quite substantial as shown in Table 5 (7.3 percentage points of national income annually!). However, the results in Table 5 show that the dissaving by the bottom 90% relative to the 1963 to 1982 period was driven to the same degree by lower financial asset accumulation.

The importance of lower financial asset accumulation by the bottom 90% can also be seen in the 2008 to 2016 period. Relative to previous years, the bottom 90% have borrowed much less per year in the last eight years of the sample, but they have continued to reduce financial asset accumulation substantially. To the degree that lower savings by the bottom 90% are a concern, the concern in recent years is not aggressive debt accumulation, but instead it is lower financial asset accumulation.

It is interesting to note that the financial asset accumulation patterns for the top 1% and bottom 90% are exactly the opposite. The top 1% are accumulating more financial assets while the bottom 90% are accumulating fewer financial assets. In addition, the top 1% may be directly financing the borrowing by the bottom 90% and the government. The next section turns to this question.

## 4 Unveiling the Financial System to Measure Saving in Debt

The top 1% of the wealth distribution has substantially increased financial asset accumulation since the early 1980s, while the bottom 90% and the government have been borrowing more. Has there been a direct link between the two patterns? This section describes an “unveiling” process that allows for a quantification of how much of the rise in financial asset accumulation of the rich has been a rise in accumulation of claims on household and government debt.

More formally, the exercise conducted in this section will allow us to split financial asset accumulation ( $\Theta_{it}^{FA}$ ) across the wealth distribution into accumulation of assets that are direct claims on household ( $\Theta_{it}^{HHD}$ ) and government debt ( $\Theta_{it}^{GOVD}$ ). Starting with  $\Theta_{it} = \Theta_{it}^{FA} + \Theta_{it}^{RE} + D_{it}$ , the goal is to further break down  $\Theta_{it}^{FA}$  into:

$$\Theta_{it}^{FA} = \Theta_{it}^{HHD} + \Theta_{it}^{GOVD} + \Theta_{it}^{RSD}$$


where  $\Theta_{it}^{RSD}$  is saving in residual financial assets not directly linked to household and government debt.

While a large body of research explores who owes debt as a liability, the methodology outlined here is designed to measure who saves in assets that are ultimately a claim on household debt and

government debt. This is an important exercise given the growing body of research that demand for specific assets determines asset prices and asset quantities (e.g., [Kojien and Yogo \(2019\)](#)). This is closely related to the idea that financial markets are segmented (e.g., [Greenwood et al. \(2018\)](#)). Financial investment is not perfectly fungible across all asset classes, and so the specific holdings of rich Americans may matter for both the price and quantity of debt outstanding.

Another motivation is the large rise in both government and household debt in the United States, shown in Figure 6. Both household debt and government debt was a steady fraction of national income from 1960 to 1980. Then, from 1980 to 2016, the combination of household and government debt in the United States scaled by GDP rose by almost 100 percentage points. A large literature in macroeconomics and finance has focused on this large rise debt, and this section shows who ultimately financed the rise in borrowing. It will also help answer an old question in economics: who ultimately receives the interest and principal payments made on government debt (e.g., [Reinhardt \(1945\)](#), [Kalecki \(1943\)](#), [Hager \(2016\)](#), [Arbogast \(2020\)](#))?

Figure 6: Government and Household Debt



This figure plots government and household debt in the United States over time, scaled by national income.

## 4.1 Unveiling the financial system

In general, the rich do not directly lend to the non-rich. Instead, they hold a variety of assets which ultimately finance borrowing by others. For example, the rich are heavy investors in money market and mutual funds. These money market and mutual funds have sizable holdings of Agency Government-Sponsored Enterprise (Agency GSE) debt. Agency GSE debt is ultimately backed by home mortgages. For government debt, the rich directly hold U.S. Treasuries and municipal

bonds; but they also lend to governments through other holdings of other assets. The unveiling exercise described here allows us to quantify how much household and government debt the rich hold through assets they hold in their portfolio.

## Overview

In the most general form, for each group  $i$ , the methodology explained here is designed to measure the total amount of an asset which is held by  $i$  at time  $t$ , or  $A_{it}$ . In total, there are  $I$  disjoint groups of households. Formally, we are looking for the vector

$$A_t = \begin{bmatrix} A_{1,t} \\ A_{2,t} \\ \vdots \\ A_{I,t} \end{bmatrix}. \quad (10)$$

Going forward, for simplicity, the time subscript  $t$  is dropped when writing specific elements of a matrix or vector, with the understanding that everything is measured for each year  $t$ . The time subscript  $t$  is kept when denoting entire matrices and vectors. The two assets unveiled in this study are government and household debt. The unveiling process is done separately for these two assets.

An asset can be held by households through various financial asset types, indexed by  $j$ . These are the same asset classes already discussed in Section 2.4 above. In particular, there are  $J$  total classes through which the asset is held, and these include pensions, mutual funds, time deposits, annuities of life insurance companies, and GSE securities, to name a few examples. We call  $F_{j,t}$  the total amount of the asset that is held through class  $j$  by households, which we calculate through an unveiling process, described in detail below. Group  $i$ 's share of asset class  $j$  is  $\omega_i^j$  (as in Section 2.4), and the assumption is made that group  $i$ 's share of household debt held through asset class  $j$  is also  $\omega_i^j$ .<sup>27</sup>

Therefore,

$$\begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ A_2 \\ \vdots \\ A_I \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_1^1 & \omega_1^2 & \cdots & \cdots & \omega_1^J \\ \omega_2^1 & \omega_2^2 & \cdots & \cdots & \omega_2^J \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \omega_I^1 & \omega_I^2 & \cdots & \cdots & \omega_I^J \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} F_1 \\ F_2 \\ \vdots \\ F_J \end{bmatrix}$$

or equivalently

$$A_t = \underset{I \times 1}{\Omega_t} \times \underset{I \times J}{\Omega_t} \times \underset{J \times 1}{F_t}. \quad (11)$$

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<sup>27</sup>It may be the case that this is not true. For example, if top 1% households own riskier mutual funds than next 9% households, then the share of mutual funds that is household debt might be higher for the next 9%.

The unveiling exercise can therefore be separated into two steps. The first step is to calculate the total amount of the asset in question held by households in each Financial Accounts asset class  $j$  to get the vector  $F_t$ . The second step is constructing the matrix  $\Omega_t$ , which contains the shares of each asset  $j$  held by group  $i$  in year  $t$ . The second step is already described in Section 2.4 above, and so we focus only on the first step below.


### **Unveiling to obtain $F_t$**

Figure 7 presents a graphical overview of the unveiling methodology. It focuses on household debt, but the process for government debt is similar. In the left most column, the figure starts with total household debt (home mortgages plus consumer credit) in the Federal Reserve Financial Accounts owed by the U.S. household sector as of 2005, scaled by national income. This happens to be almost exactly 100% of national income.

The end result in the right most column is the holdings of household debt as a financial asset by the U.S. household sector, by asset class ( $F_t$ , where  $t$  is 2005). The total amount held by the U.S. household sector is lower than the total amount owed by the U.S. household sector because the U.S. government and the rest of the world also hold household debt owed by the U.S. household sector. The unveiling process also allows us to measure how much the rest of the world and the U.S. government own of household debt.



Figure 7: Overview of Unveiling of Household Debt for 2005



This is a visual representation of the unveiling of household debt for the year 2005. The left most column is total household debt for U.S. households, and the right most column reflects the household debt held as a financial asset by the U.S. household sector. The numbers in each box are total household debt for that box scaled by national income.

Moving from left to right represents each round of unveiling. An arrow going into the box represents where the household debt comes from, and the arrows going out of the box represent where it goes to. The number in each box represents the total amount of household debt scaled by national income held in this category after taking into account all of the unveiling from previous rounds. As a result, the numbers add up to more than the total in the left most column. For example, depository institutions hold a large amount of pass-through debt, and so the 0.46 in this box reflects both household debt held directly and household debt held through holdings of agency GSE debt.

Figure 7 does not include every linkage, and it excludes the holdings of the rest of the world and the U.S. government. For these latter two categories, there should be arrows going out of each box that go to the rest of the world and to the government. All linkages are taken into account in the methodology, but for the sake of clarity not all of these linkages are shown in Figure 7.

The first round places household debt into the two major initial intermediaries: pass-throughs (which include the Government Sponsored Enterprises and issuers of asset-backed securities) and private depository institutions. The second round then unveils the pass-throughs. Pass-through

debt is held by a large number of intermediaries, and also by the household sector itself through its holdings of pensions, life insurance, and bonds.

The third round unveils the Fed, which is held primarily by the depository institutions. The Fed held no household debt in 2005, because at this point it had yet to buy any Agency GSE debt. But after 2009, the Fed held substantial household debt through its holdings of Agency GSE debt. The fourth round unveils mutual funds and money market funds.

The fifth round is quantitatively the most important. Depository institutions hold a huge amount of household debt through both their direct holdings (portfolio mortgages for example) and their purchases of pass-through debt. Post 2009, they also hold a large amount of household debt through their reserves at the Fed. As the graph shows, the claim on the depository institutions is quantitatively meaningful for many players in the economy, including non-financial corporations, non-financial non-corporate businesses, and the household sector. This is primarily due to holdings of deposits, but it is also because of the equity claim on the depository institutions.

The final two rounds unveil the non-financial business sector. This is also a quantitatively important step, because the savings by the business sector have increased substantially after 1995. For example, non-financial businesses increased their holdings of deposits and money market funds by 10 percentage points of national income (see Appendix Figure A3). These are indirect claims on household debt through the holdings of liabilities in commercial banks and money market funds. As a result, the household sector held a substantial amount of household debt through their claims on the non-financial business sector.

How do we measure the arrows that come out of each box? We are able to do so because of the excellent data in the Financial Accounts that details the claims on any given institution by other institutions. For example, let us consider the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), which are important immediate holders of household debt. Tables L.125 and L.126 in the Financial Accounts document the amount of home mortgages and consumer credit held as an asset by the GSEs. Table L.211 of the Financial Accounts documents the total debt issued by the GSEs, and the groups to which they owe these liabilities.

Take the orange arrow from the Pass-throughs to mutual funds. Table L.211 lists the share of total agency GSE liabilities held by mutual funds. The main assumption used to create the arrow is a proportionality assumption: the share of the total liabilities of the Agency GSEs held by mutual funds is assumed to be the same as the share of the total amount of household debt held by mutual funds through their holdings of Agency GSE liabilities. Then, Table L.224 of the Financial Accounts lists the groups that own shares of mutual funds, which can then be further unveiled in the next round. This is an example of how the unveiling process works. It can be done for all intermediaries to determine ultimately who holds the household debt as a financial asset.

In addition to the vector  $F_t$  (the right most column in Figure 7), this process also produces the


amount of household debt held by the government, the rest of the world, and a residual category.<sup>28</sup> Further details of the unveiling process are in Appendix Section B.1.

Once the vector  $F_t$  has been calculated, the household debt held by group  $i$  in year  $t$  can be calculated through the matrix  $\Omega_t$ , which has already been described in Section 2.4.

### The vector $F_t$ over time

The information that is gained through the unveiling process can be seen in Figure 8. The left panel focuses on household debt held as a financial asset by the U.S. household sector, and the right panel focuses on on government debt held as a financial asset by the U.S. household sector. Each bar represents the change in the asset held through a given class  $J$  over time. This is the change in the vector  $F_t$  over time. The last year for household debt is 2007 given that this year was the peak of the household debt to national income ratio, whereas the last year is 2016 for government debt which was the peak for the government debt to national income ratio. The vector  $F_t$  is scaled by national income in year  $t$  before the first difference is taken.

Figure 8: Through What Asset Classes have U.S. Households Increased Debt Holdings?



This figure shows the asset classes through which U.S. households have increased their holdings of household debt (left panel) and government debt (right panel) as financial assets.

<sup>28</sup>The residual component comprises a few factors. First, the holdings of some liabilities in the Financial Accounts are not detailed. These are gathered into one table in the Financial Accounts (L.231). Second, the unveiling process in general only moves in one direction. If there are claims against an entity by an entity that has already been unveiled, then the claim is put into a residual category. For example, loans by banks to non-financial businesses mean that some of the household debt held by non-financial businesses should be claimed by banks. But banks have already been unveiled when the round of unveiling for non-financial businesses is reached. These claims then go into the residual category.

The left panel of Figure 8 shows that the largest rise in the holdings of U.S. household debt by the household sector have been through mutual and money market funds. Households have increased their holdings of household debt by 7 percentage points of national income through these funds from 1982 to 2007. The second largest increase has been through direct bond holdings, which has been driven by direct holdings of Agency GSE bonds and privately securitized bonds. The U.S. household sector has actually decreased its holdings of household debt through checking deposits.

The U.S. household sector has also substantially increased its holdings of household debt through its holdings of equity in corporate and non-corporate businesses. This may at first be surprising. However, it is important to remember that U.S. businesses have boosted their holdings of time deposits and money market funds considerably since 1995 (see Appendix Figure A3), and these deposits ultimately finance household debt through the financial system. This rise in business deposits means that the U.S. household sector has boosted holdings of household debt through their equity holdings of businesses. For U.S. government debt, the U.S. household sector has boosted holdings primarily through pensions and mutual and money market funds.

Figure 8 makes it clear that U.S. households have increased their holdings of household and government debt through several financial asset classes that are not limited to fixed income assets. Pensions, equity, and mutual funds increasingly contain within them large claims on government and household debt. This helps to explain why households even in the top 1% of the wealth distribution, who tend to hold a higher share of business equity and mutual funds, have been financing the rise in government and household debt. This is the focus of the next subsection.

## 4.2 Saving in debt across the wealth distribution

The unveiling procedure above produces the amount of household debt and government debt held as a financial asset by group  $i$  in year  $t$ , which we call  $HHD_{it}$  and  $GOVD_{it}$ , respectively. This allows for the construction of saving in household debt and government debt which is:

$$\Theta_{it}^{HHD} = \Delta HHD_{it} - \pi_t^{HHD} HHD_{i,t-1}$$

$$\Theta_{it}^{GOVD} = \Delta GOVD_{it} - \pi_t^{GOVD} GOVD_{i,t-1}$$

In the absence of debt write-downs,  $\pi_t^{HHD}$  and  $\pi_t^{GOVD}$  would be zero. Write-downs on government debt have been trivial during our sample period, whereas there have been some write-downs on household debt. Measuring  $\pi_t^{HHD}$  would be extremely challenging, as it would require an estimate of which asset classes holding household debt ultimately experienced losses. As a result, we make the simplifying assumption that  $\pi_t^{HHD} = 0$ . It is important to note that this assumption is con-

servative. Debt write-downs would translate into a negative  $\pi_t^{HHD}$  which would increase measures of  $\Theta_{it}^{HHD}$ . Assuming zero debt write-downs on household debt makes it appear as if households are accumulating fewer claims on household debt than they actually are.

Table 6 shows the results of this exercise. More specifically, it shows total financial asset accumulation and the amount that is financial asset accumulation in household debt and government debt across the wealth distribution. Annual accumulation is scaled by contemporaneous national income, and then averages for the periods are shown.

The top 1% have experienced a large rise in both the level and the fraction of their financial asset accumulation that has been directed toward accumulation of household and government debt. From 1963 to 1982, the top 1% invested 0.7 percentage points of national income annually in household and government debt. This number increased by a factor of four after 1982. Accumulation of household debt by the top 1% was especially large from 1998 to 2007, when rich households accumulated 2.1 percentage points of national income each year. The top 1% accumulated substantial amounts of government debt from 2008 to 2016, on the order of 2 percentage points of national income every year.

Overall, from 1982 to 2016, the top 1% accumulated financial assets at an average annual rate of 5.7 percentage points of national income. Of this amount, 2.7 percentage points was invested in assets that are direct claims on household and government debt. That is, almost half of the financial asset accumulation of the top 1% has been directed toward household and government debt since 1982.

Table 6: How Much Financial Asset Accumulation is Claim on Household and Government Debt?

Top 1%				
Time Period	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{GOVD}$	$\Theta^{HHD} + \Theta^{GOVD}$
63-82	0.027	0.005	0.003	0.007
83-97	0.042	0.012	0.012	0.025
98-07	0.073	0.021	0.008	0.029
08-16	0.062	0.007	0.020	0.027
Next 9%				
Time Period	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{GOVD}$	$\Theta^{HHD} + \Theta^{GOVD}$
63-82	0.062	0.014	0.009	0.023
83-97	0.038	0.015	0.014	0.028
98-07	0.034	0.014	0.003	0.017
08-16	0.039	-0.003	0.015	0.012
Bottom 90%				
Time Period	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{GOVD}$	$\Theta^{HHD} + \Theta^{GOVD}$
63-82	0.060	0.014	0.011	0.025
83-97	0.050	0.013	0.012	0.025
98-07	0.027	0.011	0.002	0.013
08-16	0.013	-0.006	0.010	0.004

This table shows how much of the annual accumulation of financial assets ( $\Theta_{it}^{FA}$ ) is asset accumulation of claims on U.S. household debt ( $\Theta_{it}^{HHD}$ ) and U.S. government debt ( $\Theta_{it}^{GOVD}$ ). Annual accumulation is scaled by national income, and then the averages for the period is shown.

Prior to 1983, the bottom 99% of the wealth distribution invested heavily in assets that were ultimately claims on household and government debt. Since 1983, there has been a dramatic reversal. Post 2007, both the bottom 90% and the next 9% invest much less in these assets relative to the 1960s and 1970s. The bottom 90% have gone from investing 2.5 percentage points of national income in household and government debt prior to 1983 to only 0.4 percentage points after 2007.

### 4.3 Net household debt positions

The bottom 90% have been borrowing more, but they have also been reducing the amount of asset accumulation that is a direct claim on borrowing by other U.S. households. This suggests that

an important variable in assessing the financial position of U.S. households is net household debt accumulation, which we define as:

$$\Theta_{it}^{NHHD} = \Theta_{it}^{HHD} + D_{it}$$

where  $\Theta_{it}^{HHD}$  is the accumulation of household debt held as a financial asset and  $D_{it}$  is the accumulation of household debt owed as a financial liability (where negative values of  $D_{it}$  represent more borrowing).

Table 7 shows net household debt accumulation across the wealth distribution. The accumulation of household debt as a financial asset by the top 1% was offset only slightly by more borrowing from 1983 to 2007. This implies that the top 1% have seen a large increase in their net household debt position: the rich have been accumulating financial assets that are claims on household debt owed by other parts of the wealth distribution. From 1998 to 2007, the top 1% increased their claims on the borrowing of other U.S. households by 1.6 percentage points of national income per year.

Table 7: Net Household Debt Positions

Period	Bottom 90%			Next 9%			Top 1%		
	$D$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{NHHD}$	$D$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{NHHD}$	$D$	$\Theta^{HHD}$	$\Theta^{NHHD}$
63-82	-0.040	0.014	-0.026	-0.006	0.014	0.008	-0.001	0.005	0.004
83-97	-0.045	0.013	-0.032	-0.008	0.015	0.006	-0.003	0.012	0.010
98-07	-0.073	0.011	-0.062	-0.012	0.014	0.003	-0.004	0.021	0.017
08-16	-0.016	-0.006	-0.022	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	0.001	0.007	0.008

This table shows the net household debt accumulation which is defined to be  $\Theta_{it}^{NHHD} = D_{it} + \Theta_{it}^{HHD}$ , where a negative  $D$  is more borrowing. Annual accumulation is scaled by national income, and then the averages for the period are calculated.


The next 9% have borrowed more but they have also accumulated more in financial assets that are claims on household debt. As a result, the net household debt accumulation of the next 9% has been relatively steady as a percentage of national income. The bottom 90% have experienced a large decline net household debt accumulation. They have been accumulating fewer financial assets that are claims on household debt, and they have substantially increased borrowing.

Net household debt positions make it clear that beginning in the 1980s, the top 1% began to increasingly finance borrowing by the bottom 90%. Figure 9 shows the stock of household debt held as a financial asset minus the stock of household debt owed as a liability across the wealth



distribution over time. The net household debt position is scaled by national income, and the 1982 level is subtracted. At the peak in 2007, the net household debt position of the top 1% was 15 percentage points of national income, and the net household debt position of the bottom 90% was negative 40 percentage points of national income. Almost 40% of the rise in net household debt owed by the bottom 90% was financed by the top 1%.

Figure 9: Net Household Debt across Wealth Distribution Relative to 1982



This figure shows net household debt outstanding by the U.S. household sector across the wealth distribution. Net household debt is defined household debt held as a financial asset minus household debt owed as a liability. All series are scaled by national income, and the 1982 level is subtracted.


#### 4.4 Financing the rise in government and household debt

The unveiling exercise also allows us to quantify exactly how much of the additional accumulation of household and government debt shown in Figure 6 has been associated with financial asset accumulation of the rich. Figure 10 presents the evidence.

To construct Figure 10, we start in 1982 and calculate the average annual rise in debt owed by the household and government sectors scaled by contemporaneous national income. We then subtract the annual average rise in debt in the pre-period, from 1963 to 1982. The orange bar on the left shows that on average the combination of household and government debt rose annually by almost 3 percentage points of national income more from 1982 to 2016 compared to 1963 to 1982.

The unveiling exercise allows us to quantify how much of this overall additional accumulation was financed by the top 1%, the next 9%, the bottom 90%, the rest of the world, the U.S. government, and a residual component that we cannot assign.

Figure 10: Sources of Financing for Rise in Government and Household Debt




This figure shows the average annual rise in government and household debt from 1982 to 2016, where the annual rise is scaled by national income each year. It then shows how much of this rise has been financed by different groups. The five bars on the right add up to the bar on the left.

Of the 3 percentage point average annual additional accumulation of household and government debt, 2 percentage points have been due to additional accumulation by the top 1% of the wealth distribution, and 2 percentage points have been due to additional accumulation from the rest of the world. The next 9% accumulated almost the exact same post 1982 and pre-1982, while the bottom 90% reduced their accumulation of household and government debt by almost a full percentage point of national income annually. The additional borrowing by households and the government has been financed almost equally by the top 1% and the rest of the world.

As shown in Figure 6, the total amount of household and government debt in the United States is at its highest level in 50 years. Figure 11 shows the fraction of both household and government debt held by different groups as of 2016, the last year of our sample. As it shows, the top 10% hold 42% of government debt, and 50% of household debt. The top 1% hold 23% of government debt and 31% of household debt. Households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution are the largest holders of both household and government debt as of 2016, larger even than the rest of the world.

Figure 11: Who Holds Government and Household Debt as of 2016?




This figure shows the fraction of government and household debt held by different groups as of 2016.

## 5 Top Income Shares and the Saving Glut of the Rich

This section turns to potential explanations for the rise in savings by rich Americans. This requires us to go beyond aggregate data, as there have been several national trends in the United States since the early 1980s that may have affected the evolution of savings. One of these trends is the well-documented rise in income inequality.<sup>29</sup> The analysis in this section is based on a novel state-year level panel data set that allows for an investigation of whether there has been a direct connection between the rise in top income shares and the rise in savings by the rich. There was substantial state-level variation in the rise in top income shares from 1982 to 2007, as shown in Figure 12. States like Florida, New York, and Nevada witnessed a larger increase in the top 1% share of income relative to states such as Michigan, Arizona, or California.

<sup>29</sup>See, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Piketty and Saez (2003), Autor et al. (2008), Atkinson et al. (2011), Piketty et al. (2018), CBO (2019), and Smith et al. (2019). There is substantial evidence in the literature that the rise in top income shares reflected shifts in technology and globalization that began in the 1980s. This view is supported by the fact that the rise in the share of income of the top 1% is broad-based across many industries (e.g., Kaplan and Rauh (2013), Bakija et al. (2012)), and that much of these earnings are derived from human capital (Smith et al. (2019)).

Figure 12: Change in Top 1% Share of Income Across States



Data are from the World Inequality Database.

The state-level analysis tests whether states with a higher increase in top income shares experienced a greater rise in savings by those at the top of the income distribution.<sup>30</sup> State-level analysis brings us closer to an ideal experiment in which, all else equal, some economies experience a larger increase in top income shares than others. The analysis then tracks whether there is more asset accumulation in the economies with the larger increase in top income shares.

## 5.1 Measuring shares of wealth at the state level

The shares of asset class  $j$  held by group  $i$  at time  $t$  in state  $s$ ,  $\omega_{i,s,t}^j$ , can be estimated much the same way as  $\omega_{i,t}^j$  was estimated in section 2.4 given the availability of state identifiers in the DINA microfiles. However, there are a few limitations for the state level analysis.


First, state-level information is available from 1979 to 2008, which means the state level analysis must end in 2008. Second, other than the year 1982, the state level identifiers are suppressed for any tax return with an adjusted gross income (AGI) above \$200 thousand in nominal terms. In order to overcome this issue, the analysis uses state-level tax tables provided by the Statistics of Income Division (SOI) of the Internal Revenue Service. These tables contain the total number of

<sup>30</sup>Given that financial markets are well-integrated across the United States, the state-level variation in the rise in top income shares is only related to asset accumulation by those at the top of the income distribution. The associated household borrowing and dissaving by the bottom of the income distribution may happen anywhere across the United States. As a result, state-level analysis is not able to detect whether the rise in top income shares is responsible for borrowing and dissaving by those outside the top of the income distribution.

returns, interest income, dividend income, capital gains, and taxable pension income at the state level. Furthermore, these tables break down this information separately for filers with AGI above \$200 thousand. These data enable us to create a group in each state-year cell that contains all tax units that earn more than \$200 thousand in AGI. This means, however, that we must use tax units as the unit of observation instead of equal-split individuals as before.

Using information from the SOI, Figure 13 plots the share of tax filings with AGI above \$200 thousand in each state by year. The shaded area covers the full variation across states in the share of units with AGI above \$200 thousand each year. Given the \$200 thousand limit, we cannot form a group for the top 1% in each state-year cell. As shown in Figure 13, the fraction of filers below \$200 thousand is always below 6% for every state-year observation. As a result, the top 6% is chosen as the main “top income” category in the state-level analysis.<sup>31</sup> The SOI data for the group of individuals in each state-year observation with AGI above \$200 thousand allows us to apply the capitalization methodology to estimate the wealth of the top 6% of the income distribution in each state.<sup>32</sup> More details are available in Section C of the appendix.

Figure 13: Percentage of Filers with AGI Above \$200,000



The solid line shows the percentage of tax filers in the U.S. with AGI above \$200,000 over time. The shaded area represents the interval that contains this percentage for all states.

<sup>31</sup>The top 6% group for each state-year observation is the top 6% of tax units within the state, not tax units in the top 6% of the national distribution. Figure A4 in the appendix shows a strong relationship between the rise in the top 1% share of income in a state from 1982 to 2007 and the rise in top 6% share of income in the same year. The top 1% share of income at the state level is available from the World Inequality Database.

<sup>32</sup>Notice a key difference in the state-level analysis is that the wealth shares across the income distribution are used instead of the wealth shares across the wealth distribution. This is because of the issues related to missing state identifiers in the DINA and the need to use the SOI. The SOI does not include information on tax filings sorted by wealth.

## 5.2 Estimation strategy

Let  $\theta_{is} \equiv \frac{\Theta_{is}}{Y_s}$  denote saving of group  $i$  in state  $s$  relative to the state's share of national income. Suppose top-income inequality,  $\tau_s$ , rises from 1979 to 2008. The goal of this section is to estimate the parameter,

$$\beta_i = \frac{\partial \theta_{is}}{\partial \tau_s}$$

There are two ways of estimating  $\beta_i$ . First, state-level panel data can be used to regress  $\theta_{ist}$  on  $\tau_{st}$  with appropriate controls. The wealth-based estimate of  $\theta_{ist}$  is measured with considerable measurement error at the annual frequency; as a result, five-year state-level averages are taken. The estimation equation is:

$$\theta_{ist} = \alpha_s + \alpha_t + \beta_i * \tau_{st} + \Gamma * X_{st} + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (12)$$

where the log of income per capita is included in  $X_{st}$ .

The second method of estimating  $\beta_i$  uses the change in wealth at the state level for group  $i$  from 1979 to 2008. Dividing equation 7 by state income  $Y_{st}$  leads to  $\theta_{ist} = w_{ist} - \frac{1+\bar{\pi}_{st}}{1+g_{st}} w_{ist-1}$ , where  $\bar{\pi}_{st}$  is the average asset price inflation for wealth portfolio in state  $s$ , defined as  $\bar{\pi}_{st} = \frac{\sum_j \pi_{st}^j W_{st-1}^j}{\sum_j W_{st-1}^j}$ .<sup>33</sup> In this equation,  $1 + g_{st} = \frac{Y_{st}}{Y_{st-1}}$  is the state-level income growth rate.

This equation links saving in each period to wealth accumulation. Summing this equation from  $t = 0$  to  $t = T$  allows us to relate wealth accumulated by cohort  $i$  in state  $s$ ,  $\Delta w_{is}$  as a linear combination of per-period saving and initial wealth:

$$\Delta w_{is} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{R}_{st} \theta_{ist} + (\mathcal{R}_{s0} - 1) w_{is0} \quad (13)$$

where  $\Delta w_{is} = \frac{W_{isT}}{Y_{sT}} - \frac{W_{is0}}{Y_{s0}}$ ,  $w_{is0}$  is the initial wealth to state income ratio, and  $\mathcal{R}_t$  is the cumulative return on wealth relative to the size of the state economy from  $t$  until  $T$ , defined as  $\mathcal{R}_{st} = \frac{1+\bar{\pi}_{st+1}}{1+g_{st+1}} \mathcal{R}_{st+1}$  with  $\mathcal{R}_T = 1$ . Taking the derivative of equation 13 with respect to change in inequality  $\Delta \tau = \tau_{sT} - \tau_{s0}$ , we can see that  $\frac{\partial \Delta w_{is}}{\partial \Delta \tau_s} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{R}_{st} * \beta_i$ . There is therefore a proportional relationship between  $\beta_i$  and  $\bar{\beta}_i$  in specification,

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<sup>33</sup>Asset price inflation for asset  $j$  in equation 7 is the same for all states except for housing and debt liabilities under the assumptions of an integrated financial market and that households across states hold similar portfolios on average within asset class  $j$ . For housing assets, state-specific house price indices from CoreLogic are used. For debt liabilities, write-downs are applied to the top 10% and bottom 90% of the distribution in the same way as in Section 2.4.


$$\Delta w_{is} = \alpha + \bar{\beta}_i * \Delta \tau_s + \Gamma * X_s + \varepsilon_s \quad (14)$$

where  $X$  includes initial wealth as a share of national income ( $w_{is0}$ ), initial top-income share, initial log income per capita, and the change in log income per capita over the time period. We take five-year averages of the data in the beginning (1979-1983) and end (2004-2008) of the state-level sample period before taking the long difference  $\Delta$  in equation 14. Both equations 12 and 14 allow for estimation of the effect of a rise in top income shares on savings by a specific income group. Results from both estimation equations are shown below. All regressions are weighted by total number of tax units in a state so that the coefficients have nationally representative economic magnitude .

### 5.3 State-level results

Figure 14 presents the scatter-plots of  $\theta_{ist}$  and  $\tau_{st}$ , following equation 12. The two variables are adjusted using state and year fixed effects, and the residuals are plotted. The left panel shows the bivariate relationship for the top 6% and the right panel shows the same for the bottom 94%. As the figure shows, there is a positive relationship between top income shares and savings by the top 6% of the income distribution, but no relationship between top income shares and savings by the bottom 94%.


Figure 14: Change in Savings and the Rise in Top Income Shares



$\theta_{ist}$  reflects savings by group  $i$  in state  $s$  in year  $t$  scaled by state national income.  $i$  is the top 6% of the income distribution in the left panel and the bottom 94 % in the right panel.  $\tau_{st}$  is the share of income by the top 6% of the income distribution in state  $s$  in year  $t$ . All variables are adjusted using state and year fixed effects before plotting.

Figure 15 presents the scatter-plots of  $\Delta w_{is}$  and  $\Delta \tau_s$ , following equation 14. The left panel shows the bivariate relationship between the change in wealth to state-income for the top 6% of the income distribution, and the right panel shows the same for the bottom 94%. The contrast between the two figures illustrates that the entire increase in the accumulation of wealth as top income share rises is driven by top earners.

Figure 15: Change in Wealth to Income Ratios and Rise in Top Income Shares



$\Delta$  Wealth-to-income is the change in net wealth by group  $i$  in state  $s$  scaled by state national income.  $i$  is the top 6% of the income distribution in the left panel and the bottom 94% in the right panel. The  $\Delta$  reflects the change in the variable in question using the average from 2004 to 2008 minus the average from 1979 to 1983.

Column 1 of Table 8 presents the estimates of equation 12 for all income groups collectively. The top 6% income share has a statistically significant positive effect on savings in a given state. Column 2 adds a control for per-capita income which has only a minor effect on the coefficient estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present results separately for savings of the top 6% of the income distribution and bottom 94%. Top income shares are associated with higher savings by the top 6% of the income distribution, but there is no effect on savings by the bottom 94%.



Table 8: Rise in Top Income Shares and Saving (panel regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	$\Theta$	$\Theta$	$\Theta$	$\Theta$	Top 6% share	$\Theta$	$\Theta$	$\Theta$
Top 6% share	0.713*** (0.053)	0.664*** (0.121)	0.739*** (0.073)	-0.0748 (0.086)		0.712*** (0.169)	0.721*** (0.095)	-0.00934 (0.110)
Top 6% labour share					1.470*** (0.164)			
Log per capita income		0.0215 (0.048)	-0.00865 (0.032)	0.0289 (0.026)	0.0222 (0.013)	0.00358 (0.057)	-0.00512 (0.037)	0.00754 (0.032)
Group	All	All	Top 6%	Bot. 94%		All	Top 6%	Bot. 94%
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
$R^2$	0.21	0.21	0.62	0.49	0.96	0.18	0.60	0.48
Observations	306	306	306	306	306	306	306	306

The left hand side  $\theta_{ist}$  reflects savings by group  $i$  in state  $s$  in year  $t$  scaled by state national income. The top 6% share is the share of income by the top 6% of the income distribution in state  $s$  in year  $t$ . Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

One concern with the results in Table 8 is that they are partially mechanical given that capital income is both an input into the measurement of savings on the left hand side through capitalization, and the top income share on the right hand side. However, columns 5 through 8 show that this is not the case by using the top labor income share as an instrument in a two stage least square specification.

Column 5 shows that the top 6% share of labor income is strongly correlated with the top 6% income share that is used as the main RHS variable. Columns 6 through 8 repeat the exercise of columns 2 through 4, but use the predicted top 6% income share from column 5 in a 2SLS specification. This ensures that the estimated coefficients are not driven by the capital income component. The results indicate that the coefficients of interest are not materially affected.

Table 9: Rise in Top Income Shares and Wealth-to-Income Ratios

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ Top 6% share	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income	$\Delta$ wealth-to-income
$\Delta$ Top 6% share	10.68*** (1.212)	10.15*** (1.834)	10.36*** (0.973)	0.00 (2.482)		10.80*** (2.223)	9.30*** (1.047)	1.98 (2.999)
$\Delta$ Top 6% labour share					1.43*** (0.165)			
Top 6% share 79-83		-1.01 (2.951)	4.90** (1.694)	-4.01 (3.683)	0.22 (0.135)	-1.71 (3.201)	5.84*** (1.751)	-6.31 (3.999)
$\Delta$ Log per capita income		2.02** (0.702)	0.70* (0.336)	1.38 (0.835)	0.17*** (0.023)	1.91** (0.688)	0.88* (0.341)	1.05 (0.880)
Log per capita income 79-83		1.59** (0.558)	0.73* (0.297)	1.10 (0.654)	0.07* (0.034)	1.52** (0.560)	0.85** (0.315)	0.88 (0.688)
Wealth-to-income 79-83		-0.41*** (0.075)	-0.71*** (0.131)	-0.41*** (0.089)	0.00 (0.006)	-0.42*** (0.071)	-0.68*** (0.135)	-0.43*** (0.089)
Group	All	All	Top 6%	Bot. 94%		All	Top 6%	Bot. 94%
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
$R^2$	0.69	0.83	0.95	0.29	0.92	0.83	0.95	0.28
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51

$\Delta$  wealth-to-income is change in overall wealth by group  $i$  in state  $s$  scaled by state national income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .  $\Delta$  reflects the change in the variable in question using the average from 2004 to 2008 minus the average from 1979 to 1983.

Table 9 presents estimates of the second technique shown in equation 14. This specification relies on a single cross-section of long-differences. The results are similar: a rise in top income shares is associated with a substantial increase in the wealth to income ratio in a state over time. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the rise in the top 6% income share (0.036) leads to a 0.39 increase in the state-level wealth to income ratio, which is a 0.8 standard deviation of the left hand side variable.

Column 2 adds additional controls, which add statistical power but do not change the coefficient of interest materially. These controls move the specification closer to the ideal thought experiment of keeping income growth and initial conditions constant while changing the rise in top income shares.<sup>34</sup> The inclusion of the last control, the initial wealth to income ratio of income group  $i$ , ensures that the estimates are not driven by any mechanical “valuation effects.”<sup>35</sup> Columns 3 through

<sup>34</sup>Table A6 in the appendix shows how the rise in top income share is correlated with these four controls.

<sup>35</sup>The specific concern is that the drop in long-term interest rates gives all holders of wealth a capital gain. Mechanically, states where the rich hold more initial wealth as a share of income will see a larger increase in wealth. But this change is entirely driven by the “valuation effect” of lower interest rates, and has nothing to do with savings. The

8 present specifications that are analogous to those reported in Table 8; the results are similar.

An advantage of the state-level analysis is that it allows us to control for other secular trends that may be responsible for both the rise in top income shares and the rise in wealth of the rich. Table A7 in the appendix reports results analogous to column 3 of Table 9 with additional controls for demographics; the share of employment in the financial, manufacturing, and construction sector; and measures of financial deregulation. Inclusion of these controls does not affect the estimate on top income shares. This suggests that factors related to demographic change or changes in the industrial structure of employment are unlikely to explain the close link between the rise in top income shares and the rise in savings by the rich.

How are the results from Tables 8 and 9 related? Given that  $\frac{\partial \Delta w_{is}}{\partial \Delta \tau_s} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{R}_{st} * \beta_i$ , we can define  $\widehat{\frac{\partial \Delta w_{is}}{\partial \Delta \tau_s}} = \sum_{t=1}^T \overline{\mathcal{R}_t} * \widehat{\beta}_i$ , where  $\widehat{\beta}_i$  comes specifically from column 2 of Table 8 and thus equals 0.664 and  $\overline{\mathcal{R}_t} = \frac{\sum_s ||s|| \mathcal{R}_{st}}{\sum_s ||s||}$ . We define  $\mathcal{R}_{st}$  by taking  $t = 0$  as the average of 1979-1983 and  $T$  as the average of 2004-2008, with each year in between remaining independent. We can therefore compare  $\widehat{\frac{\partial \Delta w_{is}}{\partial \Delta \tau_s}}$  to the coefficient in column 2 of Table 9, which is equal to 10.15. This calculation yields  $\widehat{\frac{\partial \Delta w_{is}}{\partial \Delta \tau_s}} = 11.72$ . Both techniques reveal similar quantitative effects of top income shares on the savings by the top 6%.

Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix break down the savings and wealth accumulation by the top 6% into different components. Both tables show that the rise in top income shares is associated with a large rise in financial asset accumulation as opposed to real estate accumulation or a reduction in debt. Furthermore, about 25% to 35% of the rise in savings associated with the rise in top income shares is driven by a rise in the accumulation of assets that are directly tied to household and government debt.

Overall, the state-level results help tie the rise in top income shares to the rise in savings by those at the top of the income distribution. The rise in the saving glut of the rich has been closely connected to the well-documented rise in income inequality in the United States since the 1980s.

## 6 Conclusion and Future Directions

There has been a large rise in savings by rich Americans since the 1980s. This rise in savings has been associated with a significant dissaving by other Americans and by the government. Furthermore, Americans in the top 1% of the wealth distribution have been accumulating substantial financial claims on household and government debt. State-level analysis points to the rise in top income shares as an important factor in understanding these patterns.

What are the broader implications of the saving glut of the rich? This question is at the heart

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addition of initial holdings of household debt as a control variable mitigates this concern.

of the indebted demand model in a companion study (Mian et al. (2020)). The indebted demand model introduces non-homotheticity into the consumption-savings decision of households, and it explores the effects of a rise in income inequality and financial liberalization on interest rates and debt levels. As is shown there, a large rise in inequality generates a saving glut of the rich, which can push an economy into a debt trap characterized by low interest rates, high debt levels, and output below potential.

Another key question for future research is: why has the saving glut of the rich been associated with dissaving by other households and the government instead of higher business investment? There is a large body of research exploring the reasons behind weak investment in advanced economies. A related issue is whether the financial sector is directing the savings by the rich to other households because of government policy. For example, most of the rise in household debt since the 1980s has been associated with the rise in Agency GSE-backed mortgages, which carry either an implicit or explicit government guarantee.

Finally recent research on the economic consequences of the Covid 19 health crisis suggest that there has been a particularly large drop in spending by high income Americans, who also have experienced a smaller decline in labor income.<sup>36</sup> It is still too early to tell, but savings by the richest Americans may increase substantially as a result of the health crisis. The saving glut of the rich has already been quite large from the early 1980s to the end of our sample period in 2016; it may grow even larger in the years ahead.

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<sup>36</sup>For evidence that higher wage workers have experienced a smaller decline in labor income in response to the Covid health crisis, see Adams-Prassl et al. (2020), Cajner et al. (2020), Mongey et al. (2020), and Hoke et al. (2020). For evidence that higher income individuals have cut spending by more, see Cox et al. (2020) and Chetty et al. (2020). A recent speech by Haldane (2020) shows a large rise in saving rates by high income individuals in the United Kingdom.

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


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## A Appendix for Sections 2 and 3

### A.1 Fixed income asset return for the top 1%


Figure A1: Fixed Income Asset Returns of the Top 1% of the Wealth Distribution



This figure plots the average fixed income asset return for the top 1% of the wealth distribution in the SCF, following the methodology in [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#). The spread between the top 1% and bottom 99% return from the SCF is also plotted, along with the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate. The average spread is 95 basis points. The estimation of the fixed income asset return for the top 1% almost perfectly replicates the return reported in [Bricker et al. \(2018\)](#).

## A.2 Income and wealth shares for the top 1%

Figure A2: Top 1% Shares of Wealth and Income



The left panel plots the wealth share of the top 1% of the wealth distribution using three data sets. The first is the DINA unadjusted from [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#). The second is the DINA adjusted for the pension issue raised in [Auten and Splinter \(2019\)](#) and adjusted for a 100 basis point assumed higher interest rate earned by the top 1% of the wealth distribution. The third is from the DFA. The right panel plots the income share of the top 1% of the income distribution using the unadjusted DINA, the DINA adjusted for the pension issue, and the Congressional Budget Office.

## A.3 More details on wealth-based approach to measuring savings

This section describes the data underlying the asset inflation measures, and explores alternative methods for calculating the synthetic savings by the cohorts from wealth, which is described in [Section 2.4](#).

We first describe in detail the construction of the  $\pi_t^{ij} = 1 - WD_t^{ij}$  for debt. We begin by constructing the net chargeoff rate on mortgage and non-mortgage debt for debt borrowed by top 10% and the bottom 90% separately.

Using Call report data, we calculate net chargeoff rate on mortgage and non-mortgage consumer debt. While not all household debt is held on banks balance sheets, we proceed with the assumption that household debt held outside of the banking sector has similar net chargeoff rate as debt held by banks directly. Debt held by non-bank entities such as GSEs is likely to be less risky and hence have lower net chargeoff ratio. However, there are other non-bank entities in the shadow banking sector, such as hedge funds, that are likely to hold the most risky debt and hence have a higher net chargeoff rate. We assume that these two factors cancel out and use bank-held debt net chargeoff rate as representative of overall net chargeoff rate.

We construct annual net charge off rate as net charge offs divided by the total outstanding debt using information in Call report data. This gives us a net chargeoff rate series for mortgage debt from

1991 to 2016, and for non-mortgage consumer debt from 1983 to 2016. Net charge off on mortgage debt is not available as a separate line item prior to 1991. We therefore impute net chargeoff rate on mortgage debt from 1983 to 1990 using non-mortgage consumer credit charge off rate and charge off rate on all loans issued by banks as predictors. In particular, we regress net chargeoff rate for mortgage debt between 1991 and 2016 on net chargeoff rate on non-mortgage consumer debt and net chargeoff rate on all bank loans. The R-sq of this regression is quite high at 0.75. We then use the predicted coefficient to predict net chargeoff rate on mortgage debt from 1983 to 1990.

Prior to 1983, Call report data only allows us to construct an overall net chargeoff rate, i.e. chargeoff rate for all debt on banks balance sheets. We use this overall series to extend net chargeoff rate for mortgage and non-mortgage debt back to 1962 by regressing each of these two series (when available) directly on the overall net chargeoff rate series and using the predicted coefficients to predict net chargeoff rate back to 1962.

Once we have annual net chargeoff rate on mortgage and non-mortgage debt, we calculate how much of debt write down was on debt borrowed by the top 10% versus the bottom 90%. We do this using zipcode level data on consumer borrowing from Equifax and merging income data from the IRS. We first multiple total mortgage and total non-mortgage debt across zip codes in the U.S. to calculate the total dollar amount of debt written down every year. We then allocate the total written down amount to zip codes based on the share of total debt default that the zipcode has. We sort zip codes by their average income per capita (income measured by aggregate gross income)<sup>37</sup> and categorize zip codes into top 10% and bottom 90% by income (population weighted). Finally, we calculate the ratio of total written down debt amount to total outstanding debt within each income category and for both mortgage and non-mortgage debt separately.

The above procedure allows us to compute debt write down rate  $WD_t^{ij}$  for  $j$  equal to mortgage and non-mortgage debt, and  $i$  equal to top 10% and bottom 90% from 1991 to 2016. There is no zip code level Equifax data prior to 1991. However, we can use Equifax-based estimates to impute  $WD_t^{ij}$  for year prior to 1991 by regressing  $WD_t^{ij}$  on US-level net chargeoff rate for mortgage and non-mortgage debt respectively for years 1991 to 2016. We then use the predicted coefficients and data on net chargeoffs at the US level to back-fill  $WD_t^{ij}$  from 1962 to 1990. Exact details of all of our procedure can be seen in the accompanying code that is made public.

Next we discuss the computation of  $\pi_t^j$  for equity. The starting point for this imputation is the wealth-implied private saving in the aggregate,  $\Theta_t = \sum_{j \in J} (\Delta W_t^j - \pi_t^j W_{t-1}^j)$ . The key observation is that we know  $\Theta_t$  at the aggregate level from NIPA. We have also calculated  $\pi_t^j$  for all assets other than equity. We can therefore solve for  $\pi_t^j$  for equity assets.

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<sup>37</sup>The IRS data is missing for certain years early on, in which case we use the latest available IRS data.

## A.4 Mapping for wealth-based approach

Table A1: Mapping for Wealth-Based Approach

MSS Asset Class	Flow of Funds Equivalent	Asset inflation	DINA Asset Class	DFA Asset Class
<i>Assets</i>				
Real estate	LM155035015	Repeat-sales index (JST)	Owner-occupied housing	Real estate
Foreign deposits	LM153091003	0	Currency	Checkable deposits and currency
Checkable deposits and currency	FL153020005	0	Currency	Checkable deposits and currency
Time and savings deposits	FL153030005	0	Taxable bonds	Time deposits and short-term investments
Money market fund shares	FL153034005	0	Taxable bonds	Money market fund shares
Treasury securities	LM153061105	0	Taxable bonds	US government and municipal securities
Agency- & GSE-backed securities	LM153061705	0	Taxable bonds	Debt securities
Municipal securities	LM153062005	0	Municipal securities	US government and municipal securities
Corporate & foreign bonds	LM153063005	0	Taxable bonds	Corporate & foreign bonds
Loans & advances	FL153069005	0	Taxable bonds	Loans & advances
Mortgages	FL153065005	0	Taxable bonds	Mortgages
Corporate equities	LM153064105	Residual	Equity	Corporate equities and mutual funds
Mutual funds, equity portion	LM153064205*(Equity share of mutual funds)	Residual	Equity	Corporate equities and mutual funds
Mutual funds, fixed income portion	LM153064205*(Fixed income share of mutual funds)	0	Fixed income	Corporate equities and mutual funds
Life insurance reserves, equity portion	FL153040005*(Equity share of life insurance reserves)	Residual	Pensions	Life insurance reserves
Life insurance reserves, fixed income	FL153040005*(Fixed income share of life insurance reserves)	0	Pensions	Life insurance reserves
Pensions (excludes sponsor claims), equity portion	FL153050025*(Equity share of pensions)	Residual	Pensions	Pension entitlements
Pensions (excludes sponsor claims), fixed income portion	FL153050025*(Fixed income share of pensions)	0	Pensions	Pension entitlements
Equity in non-corporate business	LM152090205	Residual	Business	Equity in non-corporate business
Miscellaneous assets	FL153090005	Residual	Wealth minus housing	Miscellaneous assets
<i>Liabilities</i>				
Home mortgages	FL153165105	Write-down rate on home mortgages	Owner-occupied mortgage debt	Home mortgages
Consumer credit	FL153166000	Write-down rate on consumer credit	Non-mortgage debt	Consumer credit
Depository institution loans	FL153168005	Write-down rate on consumer credit	Non-mortgage debt	Consumer credit
Other loans	FL153169005	Write-down rate on consumer credit	Non-mortgage debt	Consumer credit
Deferred and unpaid life insurance premiums	FL543077073	Write-down rate on consumer credit	Non-mortgage debt	Consumer credit

This table shows the mapping of asset classes between the Financial Accounts, DINA, and the Distributional Financial Accounts.

## A.5 Implied saving rate for the top 1%

Table A2 shows the average saving rate out of own-group income for the top 1% across the different approaches used to measure savings in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Recall that the DINA and CBO approach sort individuals by income, and the wealth-based approach sorts by wealth. The average saving rates for the top 1% vary between 0.41 and 0.63, with a higher saving rate for the wealth-based approach for 1998 to 2007.

Table A2: Implied Saving Rates for the Top 1%

Period	DINA	CBO	Wealth-based
63-82	0.628	0.543	0.413
83-97	0.628	0.543	0.498
98-07	0.628	0.543	0.717
08-15	0.628	0.543	0.524

This table presents the average annual saving rates for the top 1% of the income distribution for the DINA and CBO columns, and the annual average saving rate of the top 1% of the wealth distribution for the wealth-based column. Income in the denominator is the total amount of national income earned by each group.

The best estimates of the saving rate of the top 1% of the income distribution come from the Survey of Consumer Finances. For example, [Dynan et al. \(2004\)](#) use the 1983 to 1989 panel dimension of the SCF and estimate a saving rate of the top 1% of the income distribution of 0.5. The [Fisher et al. \(2016b\)](#) study estimates an average consumption share of the top 1% from 2004 to 2016 in the SCF of 0.066. The average after-tax income share of the top 1% in the SCF during the same years is 0.173. The consumption to income ratio of the top 1% in the SCF can be calculated with these two numbers along with an adjustment factor for the levels of income and consumption, given that the consumption share of the top 1% divided by the income share of the top 1% multiplied by the aggregate level of consumption divided by aggregate level of income gives the consumption to income ratio of the top 1%. If one uses the ratio of aggregate Disposable Personal Income to Personal Consumption Expenditures estimate from the NIPA, it produces an average consumption to income ratio of the top 1% in the SCF from 2004 to 2016 of  $(0.066/0.173)*(0.91) = 0.35$ , which would imply a saving rate of the top 1% of 0.65.<sup>38</sup>

However, the saving rate from survey data is not directly comparable to the saving rate calculated in this study because survey data miss important income that has a 100% saving rate. The most obvious example is undistributed corporate profits. Undistributed corporate profits represent saving

<sup>38</sup>We thank David Johnson for helping us with this calculation.

by shareholders; such saving is captured in the methodology used in this study but missed in surveys. In addition, as mentioned in the text, [Heathcote et al. \(2010\)](#) show an average gap of 21 percentage points between the NIPA measure of personal income and the measure in the Current Population Survey. It is likely that a substantial amount of this missing income represents income with a high saving rate, such as employer contributions to pension plans or the internal dividends and interest payments earned by pensions.

Formally, suppose the saving rate of the top 1% estimated in survey data is  $\hat{\phi}_{top1} = \frac{\Theta_{top1}}{Y_{top1}}$ . Furthermore, let  $\psi_{top1}$  be income missing in surveys of the top 1% that has a 100% saving rate. Then the correct saving rate for the top 1% would be:  $\phi = \frac{\Theta + \psi}{Y + \psi}$  where the subscript is removed in order to reduce clutter. The incorrect saving rate would have to be adjusted to:

$$\phi = \frac{\hat{\phi} + \frac{\psi}{Y}}{1 + \frac{\psi}{Y}} \quad (15)$$

The critical ratio ( $\frac{\psi}{Y}$ ) is the amount of income missing in surveys that has a 100% saving rate relative to the amount of reported income in surveys. If this ratio is 0.3, for example, then the saving rate of the top 1% from surveys of 0.50 would imply a true saving rate of 0.62.

This ratio is difficult to estimate, given the lack of estimates of the income that accrues to the top 1% that is not included in surveys. However, as a lower-bound estimate, one can calculate the part of  $\psi$  that comes from the top 1% claim on undistributed corporate profits, which we know is not included in surveys as income and has a 100% saving rate. From 1998 to 2016,  $\frac{\psi}{Y}$  is estimated to be 0.23 using undistributed corporate profits alone, which would imply a true saving rate of 0.59 given a survey-reported saving rate of 0.50. This lower bound estimate convinces us that the saving rates shown in [Table A2](#) are realistic for the top 1% once all sources of income are included.

## A.6 Decomposing saving for the next 9%

Table A3: Decomposing Savings

Period	Next 9%							
	Levels				Relative to 63-82			
	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$	$\Theta$	$\Theta^{FA}$	$\Theta^{RE}$	$D$
63-82	0.065	0.062	0.009	-0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
83-97	0.039	0.038	0.009	-0.008	-0.027	-0.024	-0.001	-0.002
98-07	0.030	0.034	0.007	-0.012	-0.035	-0.028	-0.002	-0.005
08-16	0.042	0.039	0.005	-0.003	-0.023	-0.022	-0.004	0.003

This table decomposes the average annual savings by the next 9% through the equation  $\Theta_{it} = \Theta_{it}^{FA} + \Theta_{it}^{RE} + D_{it}$ .  $\Theta_{it}^{FA}$  is asset accumulation in financial assets,  $\Theta_{it}^{RE}$  is asset accumulation in real estate, and  $D_{it}$  is the change in debt (where a negative  $D$  represents more borrowing). Annual savings are scaled by national income, and then the averages for the period are calculated.

## B Appendix for Section 4

### B.1 Further details on unveiling

This section contains a few extra notes on the unveiling process. All code and data for the unveiling exercise are included in the replication kit. Below, we discuss specifically the unveiling process for household debt. But the government debt unveiling process is similar.

Formally, the unveiling procedure computes the entire set of household debt shares  $\bar{F}_j$ , including those asset classes  $j$  that are not directly owned by households. Denote by  $\bar{J}$  the number of all such asset classes. The equation pinning down  $\bar{F}$  is a “financial input-output network”. Specifically, denote by  $\eta_{j',j}$  the share of asset class  $j$ 's liabilities that are owned by asset class  $j'$ ; and denote by  $\eta_j^{HHD}$  share of household debt directly owned by asset class  $j$ . Observe that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{\bar{J}} \eta_j^{HHD} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{j'=1}^{\bar{J}} \eta_{j',j} \leq 1$$

where the latter inequality is strictly less than 1 for any asset class  $j$  that is partly owned by house-



holds.  $\bar{F}$  must then satisfy

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{F}_1 \\ \bar{F}_2 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{F}_J \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_1^{HHD} \\ \eta_2^{HHD} \\ \vdots \\ \eta_J^{HHD} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \eta_{1,1} & \eta_{1,2} & \cdots & \eta_{1,J} \\ \eta_{2,1} & \eta_{2,2} & \cdots & \eta_{2,J} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \eta_{J,1} & \eta_{J,2} & \cdots & \eta_{J,J} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \bar{F}_1 \\ \bar{F}_2 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{F}_J \end{bmatrix} \quad (16)$$

In words, this equation captures that the household debt share of asset class  $c$  is equal to its directly owned share  $\eta_j^{HHD}$ , plus the indirectly owned share through other asset classes,  $\sum_{j=1}^J \eta_{j',j} \bar{F}_j$ . The matrix product on the right hand side of this equation incorporates our assumption that the household debt owned by asset class  $j$  is attributed to its liabilities in proportion to their liabilities shares. In matrix notation, (16) can be expressed as

$$\bar{F} = \eta^{HHD} + H\bar{F}$$

which yields the solution

$$\bar{F} = (I - H)^{-1} \eta^{HHD}$$

The Leontieff inverse matrix,  $(I - H)^{-1} = I + H + H^2 + \dots$ , captures any direct and indirect ownership of household debt after an arbitrary number of rounds of unveiling. As explained above, in our case at hand, seven rounds were sufficient to conduct the unveiling.

One important adjustment is made to the DFA shares based on defined benefit pensions. A substantial fraction of defined benefit pension wealth is unfunded. An unfunded DB pension cannot be a claim on household debt because there is no actual financial asset backing the unfunded part of the pension. We therefore exclude the unfunded portion of defined benefit pensions from the measure of wealth, and we re-calculate wealth shares for the top 1%, next 9%, and bottom 90%.


Another issue that is currently ignored in the unveiling process is the fact that financial asset shares of DB and defined contribution pension funds vary across the income distribution (e.g., [Devlin-Foltz et al. \(2019\)](#)). Data kindly shared to us by Alice Henriques Volz based on [Devlin-Foltz et al. \(2019\)](#) shows that from 1989 to 2016, the top 10% share of DC assets was 53% and the top 10% share of DB assets was 48%. When excluding unfunded DB pensions, the shares of overall pensions should be adjusted given that the claim of lower income households on unfunded pensions is larger than their claim on DC pension assets. We do not currently make an adjustment given the fact that the DFA as currently structured does not provide financial asset shares separately for DB and DC pension assets. The lack of this adjustment means that the current methodology overstates the amount of household debt held as a financial asset by the bottom 90% of the income distribution through pensions.

Another issue involves equity of private depository institutions. The Financial Accounts does not include an estimate of the equity of private depository institutions, which must be taken into account when distributing the household debt held by these institutions to other entities. The estimate of private depository institution equity comes from publicly traded banks through CRSP data.

Finally, the unveiling process currently ignores the equity holdings in other financial intermediaries such as the Agency GSEs and life insurance companies. Taking into account these equity holdings will boost the share of household debt held by the top of the income distribution, given that the top of the income distribution holds a larger share of equity than other asset classes.

## B.2 Additional graphs for Section 4

Figure A3: Non-financial business deposits and money market fund holdings



Data are from the Financial Accounts.

## C Appendix for State-Level Analysis in Section 5

### C.1 More details on state-level data

In this section we describe in detail our procedure for assigning tax returns with income above 200K to individual states for the years 1979-2008, excepting 1982. Recall that the household-level public use tax files files do not contain state identifiers previous to 1979 and after 2008. For 1982 we do not need to do this because the files contain state identifiers for all observations.

As mentioned above, we obtain the mean interest, dividend, and taxable pension income for units with AGI above \$200,000 from the SOI aggregate data. In order to utilize these data in the [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) capitalization technique, we also require the mean estate income and nontaxable pension income for these same units. To have data on all asset classes of interest, we additionally need the mean municipal bond and business wealth. To obtain these data, we rely on the US DINA microfiles made available by [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#), in which we find these income variables and can directly construct the wealth variables with the [Saez and Zucman \(2016\)](#) technique. Given that state identifiers are missing for these top earners, we obtain state-level means by employing a probabilistic sampling approach.

Our key assumption in this approach is that for each state  $s$  and year  $y$  the distribution of income  $I$  for units with AGI above \$200,000 is characterized by a Pareto distribution with probability density function  $f_{sy}(I) = \frac{\alpha_{sy}200000^{\alpha_{sy}}}{I^{\alpha_{sy}+1}}$  and mean  $E_{sy}[I] = \frac{200000\alpha_{sy}}{\alpha_{sy}-1}$ . We in fact do know  $E_{sy}[I]$  thanks to the aggregate state-income group level data from the SOI - this is simply the mean AGI for units with income above \$200,000. Thus, we can obtain

$$\alpha_{sy} = \frac{E_{sy}[I]}{E_{sy}[I] - 200000}.$$

Similarly, we obtain  $\alpha_{U.S.,y}$  using U.S.-level data. For each year, we assign each state a mean estate and nontaxable pension income, as well as a mean municipal bond wealth and business wealth for units with AGI above \$200,000 by taking a weighted mean over all observations in the household tax return file with AGI above \$200,000. The weights  $w_{syi}(I)$  we use are the population weights multiplied by the relative likelihood that a household lives in a state. We calculate this relative likelihood as the ratio between  $f_{sy}(I)$  and  $f_{U.S.,y}(I)$ . Thus in each year  $y$ , for each observation  $i$  with AGI  $I_i$  and population weight  $p_i$ , the weight assigned to that observation when constructing the mean for state  $s$  is

$$w_{syi}(I_i) = p_i \times \frac{f_{sy}(I_i)}{f_{U.S.,y}(I_i)} = p_i \times \frac{\alpha_{sy}}{\alpha_{U.S.,y}} \times 200000^{\alpha_{sy}-\alpha_{U.S.,y}} \times I_i^{\alpha_{U.S.,y}-\alpha_{sy}}. \quad (17)$$

Having done this, we assign each observation, representing all filers with AGI above \$200,000 in a state, the appropriate population weight based on the number of returns filed by households with AGI over \$200,000, as reported in the aggregate SOI data. We then have the mean business and municipal bond wealth for this income group in each state. We use the mean interest, dividend and taxable pension income from the SOI aggregates in conjunction with the mean estate income and nontaxable pension income obtained through this procedure to obtain the capitalized measures of fixed income, equity and pension wealth. Again, since the SOI aggregate data contains the total number of returns with AGI above \$200,000 by state, knowing these means is sufficient to know the totals.

As a check, we can use the same procedure to obtain the sampled mean AGI for units above \$200,000 by state. Doing this and comparing the values to the true SOI aggregate data, we obtain a correlation of 0.99 and a cross-sectional  $R^2$  of 0.98 between the means in the SOI aggregates and in our sampling. This suggests that our sampling provides a close approximation to the true values of AGI. We make one final adjustment to ensure that our aggregate U.S. values match the true totals for all variables, by scaling as necessary without changing the distribution.

No imputation is required for earners below \$200,000 and for all households in 1982 - data for these earners, with state identifiers, are contained in the public-use tax files. From these capitalized measures of total fixed income, equity, business and pension wealth, as well as their subcomponents, we construct a data set that contains, for various income groups in a state and year and for all the asset classes described in Section 2.4, that group's share of the U.S. total. With this, we apply the same unveiling process used at the national level to construct a measure of how much household and government debt is owned as an asset for various income groups in a state and year.

## C.2 State-level analysis: additional tables and figures

Table A4: Rise in Top Income Shares and Saving by wealth category (panel regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Overall wealth	Financial assets	Real estate	Debt liabilities	Household debt assets	Government debt assets	Non-debt financial assets
Top 6% share	0.739*** (0.073)	0.880*** (0.073)	-0.0899*** (0.022)	-0.0506*** (0.007)	0.159*** (0.012)	0.0879*** (0.008)	0.632*** (0.056)
Log per capita income	-0.00865 (0.032)	-0.00482 (0.031)	-0.00840 (0.007)	0.00458 (0.003)	-0.00451 (0.005)	0.000493 (0.004)	-0.000809 (0.022)
$R^2$	0.62	0.72	0.61	0.49	0.75	0.80	0.73
Observations	306	306	306	306	306	306	306

The left hand side  $\theta_{ist}$  reflects savings by group  $i$  in state  $s$  in year  $t$  scaled by state national income. The top 6% share is the share of income by the top 6% of the income distribution in state  $s$  in year  $t$ . Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A5: Rise in Top Income Shares and Saving by wealth category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Overall wealth	Financial assets	Real estate	Debt liabilities	Household debt assets	Government debt assets	Non-debt financial assets
$\Delta$ Top 6% share	10.36*** (0.973)	10.33*** (1.227)	0.397 (0.383)	-0.488*** (0.087)	1.858*** (0.259)	0.880*** (0.083)	7.422*** (0.853)
Top 6% share 79-83	4.904** (1.694)	2.985 (3.529)	0.757 (0.714)	0.221 (0.186)	-0.186 (0.477)	0.150 (0.217)	3.481 (2.271)
$\Delta$ Log per capita income	0.697* (0.336)	0.808** (0.295)	-0.0726 (0.118)	0.0182 (0.026)	0.0495 (0.057)	0.0663** (0.021)	0.678** (0.216)
Log per capita income 79-83	0.728* (0.297)	0.440 (0.312)	0.181 (0.101)	0.0699* (0.027)	-0.00535 (0.064)	0.0208 (0.028)	0.437 (0.222)
Wealth-to-income 79-83	-0.714*** (0.131)	-0.566* (0.262)	-0.674*** (0.085)	-0.261*** (0.043)	0.456 (0.349)	-0.270 (0.177)	-0.767** (0.221)
$R^2$	0.95	0.94	0.79	0.66	0.91	0.92	0.95
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	51

The dependent variable in column 1 is  $\Delta$  wealth-to-income, the change in net wealth of top 6% in state  $s$  scaled by state national income. Columns 2 through 8 break down net wealth into various sub-components. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  $\Delta$  reflects the change in the variable in question using the average from 2004 to 2008 minus the average from 1979 to 1983. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A6: Relationships Between Controls and Rise in Top Income Share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Top 6% share	1.577*** (0.327)						1.108*** (0.209)
$\Delta$ Log per capita income		0.252** (0.080)					0.0992* (0.046)
Log per capita income 79-83			0.291*** (0.059)				0.0507 (0.089)
Wealth-to-income 79-83				0.0416*** (0.012)			0.0124 (0.009)
Skill sh 79-83					0.312*** (0.076)		0.00119 (0.073)
Farm/Agg sh 79-83						-0.743*** (0.191)	-0.321** (0.112)
$R^2$	0.55	0.29	0.38	0.35	0.22	0.33	0.81
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	51


Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Table A7: Relationships Between Controls and Rise in Top Income Share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Top 6% share	10.36*** (0.973)	10.49*** (0.947)	10.43*** (0.953)	10.09*** (0.970)	10.09*** (0.885)	10.80*** (0.783)	9.484*** (0.866)	10.38*** (0.895)	9.949*** (0.917)
Top 6% share 79-83	4.904** (1.694)	4.772 (2.452)	4.079 (2.280)	5.716** (1.706)	6.261** (1.798)	3.188* (1.382)	3.441* (1.422)	4.314** (1.540)	5.872** (1.735)
Δ Log per capita income	0.697* (0.336)	0.558 (0.394)	0.832 (0.489)	0.744 (0.375)	0.524 (0.374)	1.143*** (0.277)	0.801*** (0.202)	0.608* (0.301)	0.543 (0.334)
Log per capita income 79-83	0.728* (0.297)	0.367 (0.491)	0.573 (0.559)	0.834* (0.367)	0.931* (0.391)	0.333 (0.299)	0.291 (0.253)	0.797** (0.246)	0.817** (0.271)
Wealth-to-income 79-83	-0.714*** (0.131)	-0.683*** (0.163)	-0.667*** (0.156)	-0.726*** (0.148)	-0.822*** (0.134)	-0.724*** (0.121)	-0.614*** (0.115)	-0.624*** (0.132)	-0.690*** (0.137)
Control 79-83		0.654 (0.565)	0.576 (1.485)	0.692 (0.572)	-2.078*** (0.460)	-0.821* (0.392)	4.086** (1.301)	2.240 (1.184)	0.00283 (0.020)
Δ Control		0.169 (0.906)	-1.056 (1.275)	1.773 (1.223)	-2.058 (1.062)	0.630 (0.699)	-0.614 (1.016)	5.502 (2.786)	4.279 (2.811)
Control	None	Skill sh	High skill sh	Old dep. ratio	Young dep. ratio	Manufac. sh	Fin. sh	Cons. sh	Dereg
R <sup>2</sup>	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.95
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Figure A4: Change in Top 1% Share Against Change in Top 6% Share



## D Results using the DFA

The wealth-based methodology for the calculation of savings can also be done using the DFA wealth shares ( $\omega_{it}^j$ ) instead of the DINA wealth shares. The main issue with the DFA is that the data are only available for 1989 onward. As a result, it is impossible to measure the change in savings relative to the 1963 to 1982 period, which is the basis for most of the central results in this study.

Nonetheless, it is possible to compare the levels of savings from 1989 to 2016 implied by the DFA and DINA wealth shares, which is done in Table A8. As before, annual savings are scaled by contemporaneous national income, and the averages for 1989 to 2016 are shown. For the sake of comparison, Table A8 also shows averages using the DINA wealth shares for the same period in question.

Table A8: Results using DFA: 1989 to 2016

	DINA			DFA		
	Top 1%	Next 9%	Bottom 90%	Top 1%	Next 9%	Bottom 90%
$\Theta$	0.062	0.037	-0.010	0.047	0.045	-0.003
$\Delta V$	0.039	0.041	0.063	0.037	0.044	0.061
$\Delta NW$	0.100	0.078	0.053	0.084	0.090	0.058
$\Theta^{FA}$	0.062	0.040	0.026	0.045	0.049	0.034
$\Theta^{RE}$	0.002	0.005	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.006
$D$	-0.002	-0.007	-0.045	-0.002	-0.009	-0.043
$\Theta^{HHD}$	0.013	0.008	0.005	0.008	0.010	0.008
$\Theta^{GOVD}$	0.012	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.011	0.009
$\Theta^{HHD} + \Theta^{GOVD}$	0.025	0.017	0.011	0.016	0.020	0.017
$\Theta^{NHHD}$	0.011	0.001	-0.040	0.006	0.001	-0.035

This table shows measures of average annual savings across the wealth distribution using the DFA wealth shares for the 1989 to 2016 period for which the DFA data are available. It also shows results average annual savings using the DINA wealth shares over the same time period. Annual savings are scaled by contemporaneous national income, and the averages are shown.

The top 1% have the highest amount of savings ( $\Theta$ ) from 1989 to 2016 using the DFA wealth shares, and the bottom 90% have the lowest savings. However, the gap between the level of savings by the top 1% and the savings by the bottom 99% is quantitatively smaller using the DFA wealth shares. For example, average annual savings by the top 1% of the wealth distribution are 6.2 percentage points of national income using the DINA wealth shares and 4.7 percentage points of



national income using the DFA wealth shares. By construction, total savings by the three groups must add up to total private savings, and so the gap in top 1% savings between the DINA and DFA is completely accounted for by a rise in savings by the next 9% and bottom 90%. About half of the gap goes to the next 9% and half of the gap goes to the bottom 90%.


It is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that the saving glut of the rich has been smaller using the DFA wealth shares. The DFA data are not available for the pre-period from 1963 to 1982. If annual savings by the top 1% were equivalently lower from 1963 to 1982 in the DFA relative to the DINA, then the rise in savings by the top 1% would be equally large.

Average annual borrowing ( $D$ ) by the bottom 90% is similar using either the DFA or DINA wealth shares. However, the DFA wealth shares imply a lower level of financial asset accumulation ( $\Theta^{FA}$ ) by the top 1% than the DINA wealth shares do from 1989 to 2016. The gap is split almost evenly between the next 9% and the bottom 90%. This translates into a smaller amount of accumulation of household debt ( $\Theta^{HHD}$ ) and government debt ( $\Theta^{GOVD}$ ) by the top 1% using the DFA wealth shares compared to the DINA wealth shares.

However, it is once again important to emphasize that the lower levels of savings in financial assets by the top 1% does not contradict the finding using the DINA wealth shares that there has been a substantial rise in financial asset accumulation of the top 1% over time. In fact, the DINA wealth shares imply financial asset accumulation of the top 1% of 2.7 percentage points of national income from 1963 to 1982. The 4.5 percentage point financial asset accumulation of the top 1% from 1989 to 2016 using the DFA wealth shares is substantially higher. The point remains that we cannot know if financial asset accumulation increases substantially using the DFA wealth shares because the data are unavailable for the years from 1963 to 1982.

There is one main result in the study that only relies on a level and not a change: the share of government and household debt held by the top 10% of the wealth distribution as of 2016 shown in Figure 6. Using the DFA wealth shares, it continues to be the case that the top 10% of households hold the majority of household and government debt as of 2016. This is shown in Figure A5.

Figure A5: Who Holds Government and Household Debt as of 2016?



This figure shows the fraction of government and household debt held by different groups as of 2016. This figure uses DFA wealth shares.

Using the DFA wealth shares, as of 2016, the top 10% held 44% of household debt and 41% of government debt. Using the DINA wealth shares, the corresponding numbers are 53% and 47%.